The Tractatus (part 7)

So we know that Wittgenstein thought that all propositions were truth-functions of elementary propositions. Therefore, if a proposition X is analyzed into elementary propositions p and q, and they are connected by the truth-functional connective and, then the truth-value of X is determined by p and q. Remember your truth-tables?

P-------Q---------X

_______________

T-------T---------T

T-------F---------F

F-------T---------F

F-------F---------F

Hence, if X is true, both p and q have to be true. If not, then it is false. X is dependent upon the truth-values of p and q, i.e., its component parts. Thus, X is a genuine proposition. Wittgenstein demonstrated that there is a mechanical method of determining whether a proposition has sense (T. 4.31).

According to Wittgenstein there are two extreme cases amongst the possible groups of truth-conditions. In one of these cases, the proposition is true for all truth-possibilities of elementary propositions; and thus, we say that the truth-conditions are tautological. In the second case the proposition is false for all truth-possibilities, which then yields a contradiction (T. 4.46).

"Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing.

"A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a contradiction is true on no condition.

"Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.

"(Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another.)

"(For example, I know nothing about weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining.) (T. 4.461)."

"Tautologies and contradictions are not, however, non-sensical. They are part of the symbolism, much as '0' is part of the symbolism of arithmetic (T. 4.4611)."

Wittgenstein goes on to say that tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality, since they do not represent possible situations or states of affairs. Tautologies show all possible situations or states of affairs; and contradictions show us no possible situations or states of affairs (T. 4.462). These are not propositions in the strict sense, but are degenerate propositions; and any proposition that is not subject to truth-value analysis is considered non-sense, or a pseudo-proposition.

"Summarily then, language consists of propositions. All propositions can be analyzed into elementary propositions and are truth-functions of elementary propositions. The elementary propositions are immediate combinations of names, which directly refer to objects; and elementary propositions are logical pictures of atomic facts, which are immediate combinations of objects. Atomic facts combine to form facts of whatever complexity which constitute the world. Thus language is truth-functionally structured and its essential function is to describe the world. Here we have the limit of language and what amounts to the same, the limit of the world (K. T. Fann, p. 21)."

Maybe some of you can see why the Logical Positivists latched onto Wittgenstein's theory, and tried to make it support their own view of reality.

Sam26 wrote:
"Summarily then, language consists of propositions. All propositions can be analyzed into elementary propositions and are truth-functions of elementary propositions. The elementary propositions are immediate combinations of names, which directly refer to objects; and elementary propositions are logical pictures of atomic facts, which are immediate combinations of objects. Atomic facts combine to form facts of whatever complexity which constitute the world. Thus language is truth-functionally structured and its essential function is to describe the world. Here we have the limit of language and what amounts to the same, the limit of the world (K. T. Fann, p. 21)."

Maybe some of you can see why the Logical Positivists latched onto Wittgenstein's theory, and tried to make it support their own views of reality.

You have given an excellent and enjoyable rendering of Witt philosophy so far Sam, and to date you haven't made it clear how much of what you have written you agree or disagree with.So the following remarks are not meant to hold you to any position. Instead I am using the above to pick at and make my observations about the Tractatus.

language consists of propositions
Surely W cannot think that language only consists of propositions. How does his philosophy deal with perfectly meaningful non propositional sentences like "Help me" "Lift that book".What atomic facts do such sentences correspond to. Perhaps none but these non propositional sentences are clearly meaningful. Indeed how would you create a picture that would represent the command " Lift that book".

Further how does W picture theory deal with negative propositions like " A golden mountain doesn't exist" He could hardly envision a picture of a golden mountain as in what way would that be different from the opposite proposition "A golden mountain does exist".

Sol wrote:
Sam26 wrote:
"Summarily then, language consists of propositions. All propositions can be analyzed into elementary propositions and are truth-functions of elementary propositions. The elementary propositions are immediate combinations of names, which directly refer to objects; and elementary propositions are logical pictures of atomic facts, which are immediate combinations of objects. Atomic facts combine to form facts of whatever complexity which constitute the world. Thus language is truth-functionally structured and its essential function is to describe the world. Here we have the limit of language and what amounts to the same, the limit of the world (K. T. Fann, p. 21)."

Maybe some of you can see why the Logical Positivists latched onto Wittgenstein's theory, and tried to make it support their own views of reality.

You have given an excellent and enjoyable rendering of Witt philosophy so far Sam, and to date you haven't made it clear how much of what you have written you agree or disagree with.So the following remarks are not meant to hold you to any position. Instead I am using the above to pick at and make my observations about the Tractatus.

language consists of propositions
Surely W cannot think that language only consists of propositions. How does his philosophy deal with perfectly meaningful non propositional sentences like "Help me" "Lift that book".What atomic facts do such sentences correspond to. Perhaps none but these non propositional sentences are clearly meaningful. Indeed how would you create a picture that would represent the command " Lift that book".

Further how does W picture theory deal with negative propositions like " A golden mountain doesn't exist" He could hardly envision a picture of a golden mountain as in what way would that be different from the opposite proposition "A golden mountain does exist".

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein is analyzing language in terms of propositions, and as you know a proposition is a statement that can be either true or false; and since the statement "Help me" or "Lift that book" are not propositions, then they do not fall into his picture theory of language. Therefore, there are no pictures that correspond to these sentences or statements.

As to your second question - think of a painting - the painting has a sense, because it represents things in a certain way - its form. The way the elements in the picture are arranged portrays the way things may or may not be in reality. Wittgenstein uses the model of a car accident to show this, i.e., the objects used in the model either correspond to reality or they do not. Therefore, a "golden mountain" has a pictorial form, and that form either mirrors a state of affairs or it does not. Pictures have sense, so the "golden mountain" has a sense - it is the arrangement the picture claims the facts have.

Hope that helps.

You have given an excellent and enjoyable rendering of Witt philosophy so far Sam..

I second that!

Sam26 wrote:
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein is analyzing language in terms of propositions, and as you know a proposition is a statement that can be either true or false; and since the statement "Help me" or "Lift that book" are not propositions, then they do not fall into his picture theory of language. Therefore, there are no pictures that correspond to these sentences or statements.

As to your second question - think of a painting - the painting has a sense, because it represents things in a certain way - its form. The way the elements in the picture are arranged portrays the way things may or may not be in reality. Wittgenstein uses the model of a car accident to show this, i.e., the objects used in the model either correspond to reality or they do not. Therefore, a "golden mountain" has a pictorial form, and that form either mirrors a state of affairs or it does not. Pictures have sense, so the "golden mountain" has a sense - it is the arrangement the picture claims the facts have

I take your point Sam about non propositional sentences lacking a truth value and therefore can't be pictured, but I took the phrase " language consists of propositions" to imply that propositions were all that language was about. Perhaps I have misunderstood. Was Witt only interested in discussing propositions in the Tractatus because he felt he could only apply his picture theory to those kind of sentences, while recognising that non propositions were part of language and meaningful even if they couldn't be pictured. Or did W really think that propositions were all that language was about. If it was the later, he was clearly wrong. If it was the former then I find it curious he could be satisfied with producing a work dealing with language that seemed to ignore the significance of non propositions in language.Or put another did W attempt to explain how sentences like "Lift that book" get their meaning. They don't represent facts about the world. They can't be reduced to atomic propositions or be pictured. Yet they clearly are meaningful. A comprehensive theory of language needs to explain the meaningfullness of non propositional sentences.

BTW Sam I had in my original posting made some more comments about negative propositions but after reflection I decided to remove them....After a cup of cofee I saw the error of my ways

Sol wrote:
Sam26 wrote:
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein is analyzing language in terms of propositions, and as you know a proposition is a statement that can be either true or false; and since the statement "Help me" or "Lift that book" are not propositions, then they do not fall into his picture theory of language. Therefore, there are no pictures that correspond to these sentences or statements.

As to your second question - think of a painting - the painting has a sense, because it represents things in a certain way - its form. The way the elements in the picture are arranged portrays the way things may or may not be in reality. Wittgenstein uses the model of a car accident to show this, i.e., the objects used in the model either correspond to reality or they do not. Therefore, a "golden mountain" has a pictorial form, and that form either mirrors a state of affairs or it does not. Pictures have sense, so the "golden mountain" has a sense - it is the arrangement the picture claims the facts have

I take your point Sam about non propositional sentences lacking a truth value and therefore can't be pictured, but I took the phrase " language consists of propositions" to imply that propositions were all that language was about. Perhaps I have misunderstood. Was Witt only interested in discussing propositions in the Tractatus because he felt he could only apply his picture theory to those kind of sentences, while recognising that non propositions were part of language and meaningful even if they couldn't be pictured. Or did W really think that propositions were all that language was about. If it was later, he was clearly wrong. If it was the former then I find it curious he could be satisfied with producing a work dealing with language that seemed to ignore the significance of non propositions in language.

Perhaps my golden mountain example wasn't the best one to communicate my point. Suppose I was standing beside a table with nothing on it. It seems to me that what is being said is that the picture of that table could represent the proposition "The table exists", and if the picture doesn't mirror reality then the proposition is false. However, suppose I wanted to say "The cup isn't on the table", it seems quite unreasonable to suppose that the picture of the table could represent that proposition about the cup not being on the table, since that picture of the bare table represents some claim about the existence of the table, not about the cup. Surely for the picture theory to be credible each different proposition must have a different picture associated with it. If two propositions were represented by the same picture then doesn't that mean the propositions mean the same thing. The proposition "The table exists" and "The cup isn't on the table" clearly mean different things yet it hard to envision how you could represent these two propositions with different pictures.


The formally different pictures were the clash of mathematical language at the various human languages during the particularization period for re-establishing the search for words; music nevertheless had to be accepted for it's failed glory of language in various forms of nationally heritage languages.

One would wonder though if all the problems for WIttgenstein needed flawless solutions before his death, which I think was after the second world war; the movie was great though.