JKT,

I think there are individual foundational faculties that make knowledge possible, but speaking only of possible conditions of knowledge is different than how symbols acquire meaning. Ultimately, I would claim that a synthesis of usage and inherent knowing faculties give rise to meaning.


So are you saying that these faculties are inborn? I would like to know what you think causes these foundational faculties and what some of them might be. How are you able to separate them from usage?

JKT
I said: Language is spoken and the only way words as symbols acquire the meaning is through the exchange with other human beings.


I don't doubt you said the above, and nor am I denying that exchange with other humans is how we learn words and symbols. But to me what is being learned here is not a word's meaning but it's function. I just think that is a more useful and convincing conception to adopt.


Friday did not have prior knowledge of the symbol since he has never spoken Crusoe's language, but he came from other human beings. Having heard names used for things and immersed into a social situation of not knowing Crusoe's name, one of the first things typically human beings do is introduce themselves -- developed out of usage of social patterns. So, it is likely that Friday understands the gesture of Crusoe introducing his name both from the faculty of representing the viewpoint of another human being and the common courtesy of many cultures where when one meets a stranger one introduces oneself with a name -- an idea largely determined by usage.

But the problem I have with your conception of learning symbols, is how do you explain what ambiguity means. What if Robinson wanted to say that his chest was called Crusoe. I explain ambiguity by saying that since we are learning the function of the symbols, then there is an almost infinte number of concepts( innately possessed) that the symbols could be intended to point to. So ambiguity is to me the problem of figuring out which of the innately held concepts a symbol is intended to represent.
Now you may quite reasonably ask me to give a fuller account of this process of learning as I've described it. And I could certainly try, but I readily admit that a fuller account is riddled with problems.

www.ephilosopher.com/e107_plugins/forum/forum.php

The link above refers to a thread called the "Wittgenstien problem" which I instigated, and I know you have contributed to, to demonstrate that I really don't understand in any full or satisfactory sense the way humans use language. That is my 'get out jail card' you might say. I don't claim to have comprehensive set of answers. But your approach doesn't enlighten me either. In fact I feel it poses more problems than it solves. If meaning of a word is it's usage. Then how can a word be ambigous in meaning? How can you ambiguosly use something?Furthermore how do you explain why you use a word the way you do. If you entered a room full of what you percieved as particular objects you had never seen before, why do you call one object a cup and another a table. You may have seen some cups before ,but by definiton you have not seen that particular object before. Is it just some capricious whim that makes you label it the way you do. To retort I've learned how to use the word cup can't be right, as never having perceived these particular objects before how could you have been taught how to label them.

Thirdly, I really doubt that Wittgenstein's language games explains all knowledge

On this you and I are in complete agreement. To be fair to Wittgenstien, he didn't really claim is was trying to encompass all knowledge. He was really saying that we don't appear to be able to explain properly the relationship between the 'world' and the way we label it through language. So all that is left to us, is to discuss language only in terms of language. But I still find Wittgenstien's approach unsatisfactory.

Let us entertain the thought experiment that I have never had any serious training in any mathematics. Let us suppose that my knowledge of quantity is largely derived from my simple existence of gathering nuts and berries. The quantities I am familiar with would be derived from my sense of survival where the largest quantity I have ever experienced would be found in creating a surplus of food for the winter. So, I have only a general idea of quantity. I do not count. I do not even think in Base 10 numbers. Could such a human being learn from scratch to count, then learn add and subtract, then learn multiplication and division, then learn to solve for unknowns, do calculus and then eventually differential equations? Only after introduction to the concepts, never possessed before, only after usage, exposure and explanation could such a man learn to do mathematics. I think this is best explained by the representation faculty and his experience, i.e. usage

Well, the problem I have with the above is this. If ,as you appear to be suggesting , it is incredible to say that humans can acquire mathematical concepts without being taught in some way. Then how do you account for how humans ever developed mathematics. It is perfectly reasonable to assume that our ancient ancestors had no knowledge of maths. So who taught them? And even if you were to modify your beliefs by suggesting that concepts can somehow spontaneuosly occur to say a particular genius of a human being. Then when this genius tries to communincate this newly realised concept through use of words, all the words will be to this genius are symbols for the concept he already has. Put another way, the words will simply have a function to point to a particular concept.
Don't forget that mathematics, like body language, like signing for the deaf are all languages aswell. When Netwon and Leibnitz invented calculus no-one taught them this, but it must be true in a sense that they always had the concepts that make up calculus in their heads, and what discovery was for them was just becoming aware of this.

I understand the importance you attach to the community of human beings when describing how language is acquired, and I would say manifestly that is a very important component in the complex process of learning. And frankly the nature of language is so complicated, and the problem associated with it so subtle, I don't begin to profess knowledge of a complete explanation for how language develops in human beings.
But in the context of this ignorance I still find it more satisfying to describe a word as having a function, rather than a meaning, and to accept that we must already know a huge amount before language can ever happen.

Greetings,

I feel that this is getting somewhat off-topic. If I'm wrong then please put me right
-

At frist I didn't like the distinction between Semantics and Pragmatics (in linguistics), but now I think that it is a highly productive distinction.
I mean, even if the contention that word meaning is partly or wholly derived from social usage, this still fails to explain novel word usage. After all, we don't always use words in a literal sense e.g. "he's a right dog"; and similarly we don't always use words according to their agreed social definitions e.g. "Red Ken"- where it is meant as an insult.
-

In any case, my point is that if you go the whole 'meaning is derived through social & cultural influence' then by that reckoning, different cultures should have different meanings or, as you call them, 'concepts'. Sure different cultures have different BELIEFS, but concepts are mental and a part or the form of out thoughts and so different cultures should have different concepts, and it would then consequentially follow that word meanings are therefore derived. But then we're really saying that a culture/ environment is the source of meaning. But then shouldn't different environments yield languages, meanings and words that are different to other cultures? I don't see the evidence for this- if anything the evidence is strongly pointing the other way.
I'm sure that you're not saying that ALL meaning is culturally derived; however, unless you can show what part of MEANING is mental and for what reasons, then it's going to be difficult to say what part of that MEANING is culturally influenced.
-

Anyhows, I've said what I think. I've not seen any serious objections to the theory that I've stated- though don't mistake me: there are significant problems with it :-P What I'm really interested in is what MEANING is. By MEANING I am employing a somewhat Gricean distinction between natural and non-natural meaning.
//If anyone is interested I've got some brief notes on the distinction //
It is clear that words have a meaning afforded by their usage. However, this 'meaning' is indepnedent of the underlying linguistic meaning, which is attested to by the fact that ideas can be conveyed by a multitude of different words or phrases. Moreover, even if words do acquire a standardised meaning afforded by social usage, it still implies that MEANING pre-exists, which is what the words are attached to and which the social usage consequently modifies.
So, what is MEANING and what is meaning(NN)?

Bollinger,

Ambiguity...hmm well, I usually explain ambiguity as when something is not clear in a word's conception. Sometimes, other human beings intend meaning of a word to be used strictly in a general sense. If you want to talk generally of Republicans, you can. If you were in their presence and insinuated with body language and context, acquired behavior, then you could speak in ambiguous terms. If you do not understand ambiguity and its place in language, then you may want to look outside of philosophy to the English professors and their approaches to literary theory as applied to texts.

How is a word separated from its function in its meaning? For me, I think, at this point meaning and function seem the same thing. Understanding a word's usage is to understand in that context what it means.

I think that if I walked into a room filled with objects I had never seen before I would not use the word "cup." If they resembled in generality what cups are, then I would say "those cuppy-like-things." If I have seen cups and understand their use, then I can identify a cup in my experience because I have used them before.

Our ancestors out of their experience of the world developed knowledge slowly. Developing mathematical insight is not a sudden poof...oh look we have mathematics. The reason why Leibniz and Newton developed calculus is because they noticed that current mathematics did not describe planetary motion. Non-linear movement could not be described by mathematics, so they used what they did not know and what they knew from previously to invent calculus. Out of calculus, we note that things spiral and move in other funky ways so we invent differential equations for those things. All of these insights are not sudden intuitve insights but are dependent upon what came before and what direction their inventors take them at their inception.

I would say the way in which we represent things is inborn, but the way in which we affect our representations with language is acquired through the subtle forces of human community and individual epistemic agency.

JKT