Greetings,

This is my first thread starter.

The following threads would probably provide a useful background to this one:
www.ephilosopher.org/modules.php?op=modl...p;topic=106&1064
(Look at the bottom half of the page- thanks talking_dog)
www.ephilosopher.com/e107_plugins/forum/t.html&11
(This is the latest page, but all of them would be useful)
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So, what's this thread about?

Well, in a nutshell it's a question about existence and non-existence

NO WAIT! Don't swallow your tongue yet, it's not as bad as that.

We all use words to label things. This is what is referred to as the 'aboutness' of language i.e. because language is used to say stuff ABOUT things. Now, if I want to say something ABOUT a thing such as a 'dog', for example, then I can say that simply by using the word dog, I am accepting or implying that that a 'dog' is a thing and therefore, that it exists.
OK, so maybe this seems like another philosophical attempt to complicate what's quite obvious and simple- but guess what? *gasp* it's not as straightforward as all that (what a suprise).

At this point I should clarify what I mean by 'exist'. Now, most people would say that 'X exists' (e.g. a dog) if and only if there is a dog that PHYSICALLY exists in the world. However, this is quite tricky since we've got loads of ideas in our heads about things that don't really exist physically, such as Unicorns, ogres, philosophy being a highly paid career, to name but a few. Nevertheless, we don't say that they don't 'exist' since we can use words to refer to them; and if they don't exist then what exactly are these words referring to?


The problem that some people have with this view goes something like this:
If using a word to represent something is in some way suggestive that the said something exists, then what we are saying is that naming something is the same as ascribing the property of existence to that thing (implicitly).
So the question is this: If we can label a 'something' and ascribe to it the property of existence, then can we can we refer to 'something' and ascribe it the apparently opposite property of 'non-existence'?

It would seem to me that we cannot ascribe a property of any kind to that which does not exist. In fact, I would go even further and say that we cannot label that which does not exist- the reasons for which I will discuss in a bit. It also seems that by necessity, anything that exists has the property of existence. OK, that sounds like a tautology but here's why:
Only that which can be referred (i.e. a word for- technically, denoted) to can have a property; moreover, only that which can have a property can have the property of existence. So, as soon as we use a word to make a reference to something, say a dog, we are automatically required to accept that since words which refer ('denote') have properties, then the one property that it has to have is of existence.
Take for example,
1) "I love Mary".
I cannot say (in the non-verbal sense) that "I" refers to me, but I do not exist. Moreover and more importantly, I cannot say that "Mary" refers to a particular person 'Mary', but that she doesn't exist. Else why use the word Mary? Surely 'John', 'Gary', 'tractors', 'unicorns' would have done the job quite nicely. The key is that Mary is a Syntactic Object- more about this in a minute- which means that whatever she is (or it is), she in some way exists.

Why should this be? After all, I can easily say that "I love unicorns" or "I love aliens" without implying that the Object actually exists. This is why I made a distinction earlier between that which exists in the physical sense (e.g. "Fred is brave"- where Fred can be found in the world) and that which exists in a kind of mental sense (e.g. "Unicorns are clever- where unicorns can be found only in the mind).
Now, a little bit of common sense will tell us (I hope) that sentences such as "I love unicorns" do actually mean something.
Following on from what I said in the previous paragraph, it doesn't seem to make sense to say things such as, "I love unicorns, but unicorns don't exist" unless we're also going to say that sentences such as (1) can be paraphrased in a similar way e.g "I love Mary, but Mary doesn't exist". Now, we might quibble over whether Mary is a figment of my imagination, but we can't very well say that the Object Mary has no kind of existence whatsoever- for if this is the case then what are we referring to?

I think that this brings us close to the crux of the matter: In sentences such as (1) "I love Mary" we have to accept that the Object Mary exists, and thus has a property, and therefore necessarily has the property of 'existence'. This is part of the way our syntax works; and I'm not suggesting that syntax determines the way we can think about the world, but rather that the way we can think about the world is evident through our syntax.
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There is a further argument to help explain this theory but I think that this could get us all going.

The problem that some people have with this view goes something like this:
If using a word to represent something is in some way suggestive that the said something exists, then what we are saying is that naming something is the same as ascribing the property of existence to that thing (implicitly).
So the question is this: If we can label a 'something' and ascribe to it the property of existence, then can we can we refer to 'something' and ascribe it the apparently opposite property of 'non-existence'

With regard to the problem stated above let me say this.
There are some thinkers who regard the two statements below as equivalent.

(1)There is a unicorn outside my window.

(2)There exists a unicorn outside my window.

They make such statements as though the matter of what existence means, was a fairly straight forward one. Indeed, for them, all it means to say a unicorn exists outside my window is litterally to assert statement (1). They belong to a school of thought known as the deflationary theory of truth. However,to assert that (1) and (2) are simply tautologies seem to me incongrous to the way most people think and speak about the notion of existence. Most of us know in our bones, there is more to the meaning of the word existence than simply making a statement such as (1). Indeed to those who insist (1) and (2) are equivalent I would ask them to explain the difference in meaning between the two statements below.

(3) I am imagining there exists a unicorn outside my window.
(4) I am not imagining a unicorn exists. A unicorn actually exists outside my window.

Clearly (3) and (4) are meaningful statements but are clearly saying something different. So what is the difference between imaginary existence and actual existence. Although everything we talk about and think could in some sense said to be derived from experience, our perceptions could, nevertheless, be categorised in different ways. A sensory perception is not the same as having a memory, and having a memory is not the same as having an idea. To clarify that. If I am seeing a cup on the table, then the sensory perception of the cup is a different category of perception from shutting my eyes and having a mental picutre of a cup( an idea of a cup), and having a memory of sensing the the cup is a different category of perception than either sensory or mental ideas. The difference in these categories are simply self-evident to me. They are simply diferent by the nature of the perception itself.
Those familiar with "A treatise of human nature" will see how much I am borrowing from that work.
So a imaginary unicorn is a reference only to an idea of a unicorn, while an actual unicorn is a reference to sensory perception of a unicorn or a memory of a sensory perception of a unicorn. So what I am saying, is that for a person to claim a unicorn actually exists is to refer to some sensory experience they are having ,or have had( ie a memory), even if that sensory experience is just an auditory one of having heard lots of people saying there is a unicorn. While an imaginary unicorn is a reference to a mental image( an idea) no doubt composed of things already expereinced such as a horse and a horn. But a claim to be imagining something is to explicit exclude reference to any sensory perception or memory. Indeed that's exactly why you say your idea of the unicorn is imaginary.
Now as I write I am cringing inside at the inadequacy of the above explanation to fully illuminate the matters being discussed here. I can see lots of problems with it myself. I put it forward simply to invite debate and indicate a possible way of dealling with the concerns this thread has reffered to.
To me statement (1) is intrisically ambigous. It can be taken in two ways. Firstly the person making the statement is solely refering to an idea of a unicorn,( ie is asking us to imagine something) or secondly is refering to some sensory experience, or memory of a unicorn( ie is claiming something actually exists as distinct from imagines exists).
As inadequate as my comments are I find this a better approach to dealling with such matters than either Meinong's notion, that in some way unicorns "subsist". Or Russell's theory of descriptions which seems to me to side step the real issue. That is ,what is the difference in meaning between imaginary existence and actual existence.

Anon-e-mouse
Given your prodigous output, I am amazed this is your first created thread. But congratulations on creating a good one.<!-- editby --><br /><br /><i>edited by: bollinger, Mar 21, 2004 - 06:03 PM</i><!-- end editby -->

A non-e-mouse.... I'm sure that unicorn is created by our own creativity.

I've seen an artic sea animal whose has horn like uni-corn at his head.

I suggest, some human in ancient days heard about his friend traveling to the artic sea.
His friend told him about a strange mystery animal head which has a horn and was seeing from afar.
His friend also told that he saw an animal with a horn (like unicorn) among the white ice and have drawn the animal for him drafly in a piece of paper.
When he got home with his beloved horse, he slept and the next day he has a vision of a uni-horn or uni-corn. Soo, the mystery of horned animal was solve by creativity......(althought it was wrong)
Sleep increase creativity, and when you awake, the new information you create is soo real. (believe me I've enounter it, +I'm a right brainer myself)
Plus, you can't even prove using logic that the information was false because it was an independent information (not related to other).

The information created by creativity is soo real that you need to see another related physical proof to prove it was wrong.(it was impossible to how a unicorn with fake horn those days)
Since unicorn idea was created before dark ages of european, I'm sure all people will believe it and some will refer to it as a religious entities (which will make thing worse).

<i>anon-e-mouse:<i>

At this point I should clarify what I mean by 'exist'. Now, most people would say that 'X exists' (e.g. a dog) if and only if there is a dog that PHYSICALLY exists in the world. However, this is quite tricky since we've got loads of ideas in our heads about things that don't really exist physically, such as Unicorns, ogres, philosophy being a highly paid career, to name but a few.

But we <i>do</i> say that unicorns don't exist, and when we mention this what we mean is precisely that <i>there is no thing</i> in the external world that corresponds to the idea in our heads, or the description that we've written down, which we're calling 'unicorn'. I don't see what's so tricky about this.

Nevertheless, we don't say that they don't 'exist' since we can use words to refer to them; and if they don't exist then what exactly are these words referring to?

They're referring to mere ideas, or unsatisfied descriptions if you like. Why are you assuming that the fact of a words referring to something has to indicate that the something to which it refers has to exist? That seems to me to be an assumption that needs some support.

So the question is this: If we can label a 'something' and ascribe to it the property of existence, then can we can we refer to 'something' and ascribe it the apparently opposite property of 'non-existence'?

I'm one of those uncomfortable with treating existence as a predicate at all, and for the usual reasons. For one, I'm just not sure any sensible account can be given of what <i>existence</i> is that would make such ascriptions (be they affirmative or negative) informative. Secondly, it seems to me the common usage of the word 'existence' just isn't a reliable guide to the determination of its meaning (I know, I'm a heretic. You can burn a little matchstick doggy in effigy in an ashtray by your computer if you like). Following usage with regard to a word like existence seems to me to be part of the problem here, for reasons I'll mention in a moment. Lastly, I dislike the treatment of existence as a predicate for pragmatic reasons. I think treating existence as a predicate leads us into the trap of trying to figure out what sort of property it is. This is a red herring because if we don't know what existence is, we surely aren't going to be able to find out what sort of property it is or how it relates with other properties. It seems to me to be much better either to stipulate what one intends by 'exist' in a given context or just to remain silent.

So, as soon as we use a word to make a reference to something, say a dog, we are automatically required to accept that since words which refer ('denote') have properties , then the one property that it has to have is of existence.

Well, lets be appropriately nerdly and careful here. It's the <i>things to which the words refer</i> that have the properties in which we have an interest here, not the words themselves. I would be careful about this lest the temptation to slide from word to idea take hold and lead us down the primrose path to Meinong or Berkeley.

Now in light of all this and in light of Bollinger's suggestion that

Russell 's theory of descriptions which seems to me to side step the real issue. That is ,what is the difference in meaning between imaginary existence and actual existence.

I want to make a suggestion here: I think you all may be barking up the wrong tree by dividing up types of existence. It seems to me that, on the contrary, 'existence' is univocal and that there are types of things that exist.

To clarify, think here of existence as a kind of check-box. If a thing exists then there is a check in the box. If a thing does not exist then there is no check in the box. It's an exclusive disjunction. One or the other has to be the case. It can never be neither and it can never be both. This is all I wish to say about what we know of existence. That's as far as I think we can get while retaining our honesty. When we say that a thing exists then all we're saying is that the box is checked. When we say that a thing does not exist then all we're saying is that the box is not checked.

Bearing this in mind let's return to the unicorn. We all seem to agree that unicorns are not like rabbits in the sense that we have absolutely no chance of bumping into one. All this means is that whatever 'unicorn' may denote, it fails to denote anything that shares any physical property in common with any other animal. Fine. Does this mean that 'unicorn' picks out something that doesn't exist then? <b>No</b>-- not unless one is using 'exist' in a way that packs in information about the features of the world external to our minds. (Note that I don't wish to do this, hence my limited account of existence above.) In fact, what the word 'unicorn' picks out is not a thing in the standard (physical) sense, but an idea (or a description, if you prefer). And now here's the really radical part: Ideas, thoughts, and descriptions exist too. When we say that an idea exists, we're using the word 'exists' in precisely the same way as we are when we're talking about tables and chairs. (Ideas and thoughts even have a physical component in the brain chemistry that makes it possible for us to think them!) Ideas and thoughts just don't exist <i>in the external world.</i> They exist in our heads. Sloppy usage may not be able to capture the difference, but more careful (dare I say corrected) usage can, can't it?

td

Greetings,

talking_dog-

I read your post and was rather confused when I got to the last paragraph. The tone of your post indicated that you didn't agree with me (as did your 'conclusion')- yet, your seem to be saying what I am. Maybe you misread my post, or perhaps I should have spelt out what I meant a bit more clearly.
My point is to remove the distinction where we can apply properties to the mental and the physical; instead, I want to say that we can apply these properties to our ideas, which are derived either from experience or introspection (imagination etc).

I give a proper reply when a get a minute free.

Plato's Beard needs a trimming by Ockham's Razor.

Seriously though, I think we need to get away from this "existing inside the head" type thinking. Things don't exist-in the sense of exist that we want-inside heads. What exists inside my head is my brain. You might even say that thoughts or conceptions "exist" or are inside my head. But these things are not the kinds of things that anon-mouse purports to exist. The thought or conception of a unicorn would not be identical to a real existing unicorn (if one could exist). Let's not confuse the conception of things with the things themselves, yeah? (Unless you're a conceptualist about reality). :roll: <!-- editby --><br /><br /><i>edited by: sordavie, Mar 22, 2004 - 05:18 PM</i><!-- end editby -->