leonardomenderes wrote:
I keep wondering how strict logic can be applied to imprecise knowledge. And the forced epistemology seems like the self-deceptive outcome....often.

I see logic as just a tool in our quest for knowledge. It is not the be all and end all that some people make it to be; however, it is an important tool. We use it to justify inductive and deductive arguments, and this helps to advance our knowledge via those vehicles. However, we cannot, and should not think that knowledge only comes in this form. We can justify what we believe through other means at our disposal, and we do - using experience, testimony, and linguistic training. However, this is a topic that will lead us further away from my point.

leonardomenderes wrote:
I think you are saying....just to clarify...what's the use of sharpening
the language itself, when what it describes cannot be contained as
precisely as the language assumes? Dealing with this problem seems
to demand not just a different take on language, but on the epistemology.
It isn't easy, but if we can live our lives every day with imprecision,
Philosophy should be able to as well. Setting conventions is OK, as
long as the definitions and assumptions are not recklessly pushed
outside of the convention's assumptions.

Well, I am not saying that we should not strive for perfection, only that we should not strive for perfection where none exists. Language by its very nature is not a calculus - it is vague and imprecise, so to think that we can give precise definitions to words like 'knowledge' is to commit ourselves to an endless pursuit.

I remember arguing with TD about the definition of 'torture,' and we were going to start a separate thread to argue this very thing. After thinking about it, I thought that it would be a useless endeavor, because it would be like trying to answer the question about when the hair on your face actually became a beard.

We feel that we need to draw a line, and we do need too, but part of the reason we cannot arrive at precision here is because of the nature of the proposition. There is no definition that will give us what we are looking for - there is no essence here that we can find - only family resemblances, that may or may not fit certain contexts. There is just too much to describe- too many different possibilities.

Do not conclude from this, that I do not think that we should not be as precise as possible; and in some cases, as in the torture case, we do need to be as precise as is humanly possible because of the moral implications.

There is so much more to this question than meets the eye, which is why much of what Wittgenstein said, is to this day misunderstood. If I can just understand one half of what he was trying to say, I will be better off for it.

And if people would quit trying to fit Wittgenstein's method into argument form (including myself), and focus on what he was doing, they would be better off.

I am not sure what this has to do with what I was asking at the beginning of the thread.

First, you say that Wittgenstein's arguments are not apodeictic or apodictic, which is to say that his arguments are not necessarily the case, or that they are impossible. Why anyone would make such a claim, or even think that Wittgenstein's earlier or later philosophy needs to be apodictic is beyond me.

Second, you say his religious finale is not psychotic enough - whatever that means. Maybe your telling jokes here. After all, one could do philosophy by simply telling jokes.

Finally, studying Wittgenstein (at least for me) is not about being a Wittgensteinian. I could care less about being the follower of any philosopher or scientist for that matter. For me, it has to do with whether the person (philosopher or scientist) has something important to say. If they do have something important to say, then it behooves us to try and understand it. Furthermore, I think that it is clear that Wittgenstein has something important to contribute.
Why is it beyond you that a long series of arguments that are not necessarily the case are not as believable as some terse argumentation? It seems completely obvious.

After all if you could be less pompous you might see that I was saying that that book's attempt at mysticism at its end seem slightly anemic and do not do justice to its possibilities. if you value religion at all then that's relevant, whereas if you want to just follow the text the my first point is.
there is my reason to not get so carried away by the tractatus, which answers your first question as to why i'm commenting on your thread and what it's got to do with your post

I am a student of Wittgenstein's philosophy...

Any comments...and I commented on Wittgenstein...

also wrt to your final comment: i didn't mean anything about wittgenstein "the man" i was referring to taking his philosophy wholesale. that leads on to my own incidental conclusion that i think wittgenstein is easy enough to understand (i.e. he's long winded and not the best mystic - in that his attempts to verbalize the edges of language before one stays silent IMHO are silly enough to jeopardize the intuitive appeal of that book) it's more difficult to place his contribution in context.



for sure i'm being facetious by calling you pompous and wittgenstein silly but this *is* a bulletin board and *not* school. and whatever the tractatus is a good read and an important book...

Well, I am not saying that we should not strive for perfection, only that we should not strive for perfection where none exists. Language by its very nature is not a calculus - it is vague and imprecise, so to think that we can give precise definitions to words like 'knowledge' is to commit ourselves to an endless pursuit.


I understand. Sometimes the language used is imprecise, by the nature of the users,
and sometimes causality is imprecise, so a language of simplistic causality fails.
That's all. My scope was not as wide.



I remember arguing with TD about the definition of 'torture,' and we were going to start a separate thread to argue this very thing. After thinking about it, I thought that it would be a useless endeavor, because it would be like trying to answer the question about when the hair on your face actually became a beard.


Example are always hugely helpful. There were a pretty well-established bounds
for what constituted torture before it became a hot topic vis-a-vis Guantanamo.
The US even had decades of argeeing, endorsing, signing, and prosecuting under
those boundaries. It was clear, legally and globally, at least. Now, this
is what is called a "convention" that everyone agrees to.
What happens next is a radical redefinition of torture (under GWB) so that
it can be said there wasn't any at all, unless the pain like "internal organ failure"
and "death" was felt. Now, medically, ethically, legally, and by treaty,
that was wildly fabricated epistemology.
But.....to the point of the thread:
--either you agree to widely held conventions, or you
ditch the whole line of any argument, when you begin again
inventing definitions others have established.
Whether you get tighter or looser: you blow everything entirely away
by making up a definition to suit your ends.
It is just like painting a house yellow, changing the definition of
yellow (under ASTM standards) and saying "I did not paint your house yellow".
Or changing a football field's length to score. You cannot be trusted, by anyone.



We feel that we need to draw a line, and we do need too, but part of the reason we cannot arrive at precision here is because of the nature of the proposition. There is no definition that will give us what we are looking for - there is no essence here that we can find - only family resemblances, that may or may not fit certain contexts. There is just too much to describe- too many different possibilities.


Sometimes, yes, sometimes no.
Your example raises the spectre of disrupting very well established
precision. By convention, that is.

"Torture" is not quite like "yellow", but it is a lot like "dirty", as defined
by the board of health. Specific signs are actually defined. Challenge them
and you chuck the language. Say it cannot be defined and you are out of
the market. Make up your own term, like "reasonable and necessary torture",
and you are back alive, but only in your defined conventions.



Do not conclude from this, that I do not think that we should not be as precise as possible; and in some cases, as in the torture case, we do need to be as precise as is humanly possible because of the moral implications.


Yes. Understood. There is a convention, so it is fairly easy.
If, that is, you accept Western law history and international treaties, that is.
Other things, like when a "soul" begins and how a 'soul' makes a citizen,
are no so well conventionalized.



There is so much more to this question than meets the eye, which is why much of what Wittgenstein said, is to this day misunderstood. If I can just understand one half of what he was trying to say, I will be better off for it.


I think he actually actually got tripped up sometimes by
demanding precision or rejecting something as impossible.
"Close enough", "there is a standard", or "most people agree",
or even "it works repeatably" suffice for 99% of all commerce in
day-to-day words. Wittgenstein himself does suggest that,
that the usage of language determines its meaning.
He them often goes wandering into cognitive matters
unknown to anyone for many decades after, though.
Too much expertise about other minds is assumed
in his. Unfortunately, like the comment you like says.

And yeah, in general, Wittgenstein had issues, but had
a lot of great ideas. I think the best ideas were
the openers, the principles. The details may have
missed a lot for ignoring the common world, which
is,, after all where language is born.
The job a word has is often a great clue
to what it means....the 'how', not the 'what',
which could even be changing.


And if people would quit trying to fit Wittgenstein's method into argument form (including myself), and focus on what he was doing, they would be better off.

And if people would quit trying to fit Wittgenstein's method into argument form (including myself), and focus on what he was doing, they would be better off.
Actually I disagree entirely. Yeah I think that it's philosophical context is critical in understanding its worth. But I noticed that you might not agree that a philosopher is doing what his argument does.

Surely!

--
Here is a word, or a phrase. I tell you.
Here is what is means, or doesn't.
--

Argumentation might be handy in fleshing that out,
but it isn't anywhere near the importance of
what the thing means. Usage, usage, usage <--per Witt himself.

Argumentation as key to a word is not a good thing.
Taking usage and real meaning into consideration
iun your argument is common sense. (not common)

I think most of the skill in writing is to compose sentences that are not ambiguous.

E.g. if I had said 'I think most of the skill in writing is found in composing a sentence that is not ambiguous', I might not be writing a sentence about how skill in writing is ambiguous: perhaps I would be trying to say something about how one either writes well formed sentences or not. No??

But I'm sure you all understand what ambiguity is







Sorry I haven't followed this discussion well enough to be sure but Leonardmenderes are you saying that philosophical positions primarily rely on their own peculiar definitions of words to convince rather than any inferences or argumentation? You could be right! But I disagree.

Obviously the argument in any [maybe some?] normal sentence is parasitic to what the sentence means. But beyond that? An utterer of a sentence can say something and intend to have others understand him or her according to the correct definition of each word, but still say an untrue statement. E.g., Imagine I am trying to convey the idea that the moon is made of cheese. I say "the moon is made of cheese", thus using each word correctly. But unfortunately I am wrong and the moon is made of moon rock. You can't deny that the sentence can be understood literally, so I very much doubt that it cannot mean that, that I cannot intend to say that the moon is made of cheese. So here we have a very clear example of using words correctly but being wrong, and so it necessarily follows that using the right definition of a term is not enough to be correct.
It would still be possible that being correct entails that you use words according to their "true definitions" but that's a whole other point that I'm probably not going sweat out unless you make it clear what the post I was replying to meant. All the best.


Edit you probably weren't saying what I thought you were. denying that untrue propositions can be understood enough to be repeated as if they were true, would be very silly. Edit and obviously if that is true the existence of untrue propositions is undeniable.