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I read about this a while back in an essay (and I know, I know, I could probably find a link to it easily enough if I tried but I don't feel like it right now...): we as philosophers are used enough to debating whether all our perceptual states are hallucinations caused by Cartesian deceivers or mad neuroscientists or whatever, but now what about our moral apprehension, too? Could there be some moral evil demon out there systematically deluding us about right and wrong?
This problem strikes more strongly at some strains of moral epistemology than others, granted, e.g. Moore-type intuitionists. As per the utilitarian equation of happiness (or some isotope thereof) with moral value, for a utilitarian the moral evil demon would be a subspecies of the broader Cartesian phylum (since the perception of something as making someone happy is a part of our ordinary empirical perception called into question by Descartes). But a more purely a priori ethic like Kant's, for instance, might be fairly impervious to the danger, I think.
And now I'll let you guys react to that...
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