<strong>An Rogaire Dubh wrote:</strong>
This is the old way of thinking though Szavieur, where we make a big deal about individual knowledge, and ignore what I am calling aggregated knowledge. I'm not claiming that the group would be disparately self-aware, in fact I'm not talking about anybody being self-aware, I'm only talking about the members of the group being conscious, and thereby indubitably knowing that they are conscious.
Well, there's
plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-social/ and then there's
plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/. And "indubitably knowing that they are conscious" means "self-aware." But how does acknowledging (in principle) aggregated knowledge solve the sub-aggregate problem of knowing whether people besides myself exist?
My proposed solution is based on the idea that, while I don't know that other conscious beings are conscious, they do. Is it not therefore possible to aggregate the knowledge of all conscious beings?
I guess at this point I will ask you what you mean by
aggregate.