JHuber wrote:
If their ideas depend on a set of conditions then they are conditionally right.

Yeah, and if the conditions obtain, then they're actually right, too.

...well it is the same thing. Syntax is the arrangement of words as elements in a sentence to show their relationship to one another. The object in the predicate isn't doing the changing. The subject is. Objects have no effect. Subjects do.

Consciousness is not the same thing as being that of which predicates are affirmed or denied. "The object in the predicate isn't doing the changing," is false of, say, "I killed the tree," since in that case the tree dies.

Trying to unravel the mysteries of the universe just by citing syncategorematic considerations is not the most comprehensive way to account for those mysteries.

No, every point of view is not the point of view of an object. Objects have no emotions.

If object is defined as, "Something lacking emotions," then sure. But if it includes regular combinations of matter and energy like us, then it remains open to question whether there are objects with emotions (if our objecthood is the seat of our passions, etc.).

I'm searching for the truth. Otherwise, I'm wrong. Care to start a new thread about that or should I?

"Otherwise" than what? If you don't search for truth, you're doing something wrong? Well, maybe. I'm not sure what you mean by "start a new thread about that," though.

Consciousness is not the same thing as being that of which predicates are affirmed or denied. "The object in the predicate isn't doing the changing," is false of, say, "I killed the tree," since in that case the tree dies.

Trying to unravel the mysteries of the universe just by citing syncategorematic considerations is not the most comprehensive way to account for those mysteries.


The object of the predicate isn't always an actual object. Whoever decided to call the object of the predicate an "object" probably only did so out of lack of a better word. When you say, "I am killing the tree," it is I that is changing, doing the work, the tree isn't. "The tree dies," is a different statement. In that case the tree is the subject. It is changing, doing the work.

Syntactic considerations of subjects and relations is something I used to think about. It is a stage.

If object is defined as, "Something lacking emotions," then sure. But if it includes regular combinations of matter and energy like us, then it remains open to question whether there are objects with emotions (if our objecthood is the seat of our passions, etc.).

To an engineer everything is an object. To a writer or a speaker everything is a subject. Physically you are an object but that definition neglects your subjective component. It is your subjective component that contains your emotions.

I'm not sure what you mean by "start a new thread about that," though.

What I meant was start a different discussion in this forum to see if others agree with your definition of morality as "unconditional practical reasoning."
I'd like to think about it further though. I might end up agreeing with this. I'd like to fit it directly into my theory somehow.

JHuber wrote:
The object of the predicate isn't always an actual object. Whoever decided to call the object of the predicate an "object" probably only did so out of lack of a better word.

Or object is just a malleable word.

When you say, "I am killing the tree," it is I that is changing, doing the work, the tree isn't. "The tree dies," is a different statement. In that case the tree is the subject. It is changing, doing the work.

Okay, change can be very roughly defined as "difference through time." Something differing through time can be the subject OR the predicate of a subject-predicate assertion.

Syntactic considerations of subjects and relations is something I used to think about. It is a stage.

It's not clear to me how much you're past it, though. It's like what Kant criticizes regarding the classical definition of substantiality as the inability to serve for the logical predicate in a proposition: trying to derive way too much from extremely slender forms of thought.

To an engineer everything is an object. To a writer or a speaker everything is a subject. Physically you are an object but that definition neglects your subjective component. It is your subjective component that contains your emotions.

Again, though, subjectivity as consciousness is different from being the subject of a sentence. Consider Frege's functional logic. This arguably expresses the logical structure of reality, but it does so minus any explicit subject-predicate conceptual schematic (or something along those lines).

What I meant was start a different discussion in this forum to see if others agree with your definition of morality as "unconditional practical reasoning." I'd like to think about it further though. I might end up agreeing with this. I'd like to fit it directly into my theory somehow.

Well, I'm not too concerned with anyone agreeing exactly with my definition. I mean a definition may take the form of a declarative sentence, but especially to stipulatively define a word is to make a sort of incontrovertible statement. Now also anyway, Kant and Aristotle (throw in Mill, too) would all tend to agree with my definition, more or less so, yeah.

It's not clear to me how much you're past it, though. It's like what Kant criticizes regarding the classical definition of substantiality as the inability to serve for the logical predicate in a proposition: trying to derive way too much from extremely slender forms of thought.

Well, I don't consider syntax to be irrelevant to subjects and relations.

Again, though, subjectivity as consciousness is different from being the subject of a sentence. Consider Frege's functional logic. This arguably expresses the logical structure of reality, but it does so minus any explicit subject-predicate conceptual schematic (or something along those lines).

Thinking of it further, where is the fault in this scenario? Whether I call a car a subject, object or unit it is still just a car. However, each of these classes conceptualizes the same car differently. The subject class contains the emotional component. It is the one that changes, does the work, gets affected. As an object or a unit, a car doesn't get affected. Yet it is still the same car.

The same principle applies to syntax. The subject gets affected, the object does not. Objects can't get affected. They have no emotions. When an object does get affected it is as a subject.

JHuber wrote:
Well, I don't consider syntax to be irrelevant to subjects and relations.

Think of it like this: the subject-predicate relationship is more evident to us as a linguistic fact than as a metaphysical one. Now the structure of language might somehow match up to some reified logical structure of reality, granted. But to get from point A to point B in this case, I suspect (again) that we need more than the fact that the word subject admits of both a linguistic and a cognitive(?) meaning.

Objects can't get affected. They have no emotions.

But "affected" disambiguates as meaning something having to do with the effect of some cause or something having to do with emotions.

If you'd like to say, "People, as subjects, feel things, but as objects they don't," and you're just stipulatively defining subject and object, fine, but your argument then holds only for your privately defined reality, not for everyone else, too.

Think of it like this: the subject-predicate relationship is more evident to us as a linguistic fact than as a metaphysical one. Now the structure of language might somehow match up to some reified logical structure of reality, granted. But to get from point A to point B in this case, I suspect (again) that we need more than the fact that the word subject admits of both a linguistic and a cognitive(?) meaning.

Linguistics is cognitive. One has to use linguistics in order to explain linguistics. The only way to do so is if the word subject admits of both a linguistic and a cognitive meaning. Otherwise, linguistics is babble.


If you'd like to say, "People, as subjects, feel things, but as objects they don't," and you're just stipulatively defining subject and object, fine, but your argument then holds only for your privately defined reality, not for everyone else, too.

I can only inductively prove that, "People, as subjects, feel things, but as objects they don't." In computer programming, everything is an object. All classes are inherited from the class object. Computer programs are designed by using the unified modeling language, UML. The UML includes elements such as associative relations (black arrowheads) and generalization relations (hollow arrowheads). The UML does not include elements of emotion. When an object gets created or destroyed there is no emotional effect. Everyone should know this. It is not my private reality. As for emotional effects there are hospitals. In hospitals people are subjects, not objects. There is no hospital in the world that says on the admittance form, "Object's Name..."