JHuber wrote:
The only way to be truly non-subjective is to talk about subjects as a whole. The way to do that is by subjects and relations.

"To think about subjects in general, you have to think about subjects and relations," is alright (tautological, actually), but, "Objectivity requires purely general thinking," isn't. Again, there's too little information or meaning to the words subject and relation all by themselves. To think about other objects, even, or particular objects I should say, you have to take into account more than just the fact that those objects are subjects related to other subjects.

To further test this definition, how is this definition different from loyalty? In other words, what is the difference between moral duty and loyal duty?

Loyalty could be seen as unconditional devotion to something, I guess. But inasmuch as it could be unconditional devotion to something very unethical, loyalty in itself isn't a virtue. It's only a virtue when the thing a person is loyal to is also morally good.

"To think about subjects in general, you have to think about subjects and relations," is alright (tautological, actually), but, "Objectivity requires purely general thinking," isn't. Again, there's too little information or meaning to the words subject and relation all by themselves. To think about other objects, even, or particular objects I should say, you have to take into account more than just the fact that those objects are subjects related to other subjects.

If what you are saying is true, then all the elements in the original post of this thread wouldn't exist.

The reason there is too little information or meaning to the words subject and relation all by themselves is because they are so heavily used. It was very difficult for me to figure out this theory, I think of it as the mother of all brainstorms.

Loyalty could be seen as unconditional devotion to something, I guess. But inasmuch as it could be unconditional devotion to something very unethical, loyalty in itself isn't a virtue. It's only a virtue when the thing a person is loyal to is also morally good.

Ok, but wouldn't the difference between moral duty and loyal duty be that moral duty pertained to life and loyal duty pertained to authority? For example, it is our moral obligation to protect endangered species and it is our loyal obligation to pay our taxes.

JHuber wrote:
If what you are saying is true, then all the elements in the original post of this thread wouldn't exist.

Or else they would exist but defined in a different way.

The reason there is too little information or meaning to the words subject and relation all by themselves is because they are so heavily used. It was very difficult for me to figure out this theory, I think of it as the mother of all brainstorms.

"Subject" and "relation" are heavily used? I'm not so sure about that. But even if they are, that doesn't determine their ambiguity. For example, "the" is heavily used, but that's not why it has such an abstract function.

Ok, but wouldn't the difference between moral duty and loyal duty be that moral duty pertained to life and loyal duty pertained to authority? For example, it is our moral obligation to protect endangered species and it is our loyal obligation to pay our taxes.

Life includes authorities, though (I mean, you live and deal with the authorities). "Moral obligation" is almost redundant, even.

If what you are saying is true, then all the elements in the original post of this thread wouldn't exist.

Or else they would exist but defined in a different way.

Spinoza defined them in terms of pleasure, pain and desire. Recently; Ortney, Clone and McClure defined them in terms of agents, events and they also use the term objects. There are many others of course. Is everyone right? If you smash an object there is no emotional effect. If you smash the same item but think of it as a subject there is. The word objectivity exists as the point of view of an object, there is no bias.

"Subject" and "relation" are heavily used? I'm not so sure about that. But even if they are, that doesn't determine their ambiguity. For example, "the" is heavily used, but that's not why it has such an abstract function.

Anything can be either a subject, object, unit, entity, thing, item or element. These are all ambiguous nouns. Kant called them nounema which is to noun as phenomena is to phenom. The problem with nounema is that it is the ambiguous of the ambiguous. You maybe a nounema but so is a ball. You are a subject but you are not an object.

"The" is an article used to identify an intrinsic subject. It means one item amongst others. The prepositions, "of" and "in," are used to identify extrinsic subjects. "Of" signifies possession, "in" signifies right. There is no such thing as a regular subject. All subjects are either intrinsic or extrinsic. Often the extrinsic subject is implied. Topics are extrinsic subjects.

Relation is quite heavily used. It also comes in the forms of relevant, relative and of course relationship. When conscious of the word, it is amazing how versatile it is.

Life includes authorities, though (I mean, you live and deal with the authorities). "Moral obligation" is almost redundant, even.

That is not what I meant. I believe the deep reasoning behind the use of morals has to do with the promotion and protection of life. Also, the deep reasoning behind ethics has to do with fairness.

JHuber wrote:
Spinoza defined them in terms of pleasure, pain and desire. Recently; Ortney, Clone and McClure defined them in terms of agents, events and they also use the term objects. There are many others of course. Is everyone right?

Probably in some way. A lot of their differences might just be a matter of talking about different topics while using the same words. Or else the systems they variously describe interact enough so that the same set of conditions that one of these writers associates definitively with a certain emotion is associated with the set of conditions another defines the same emotion with.

If you smash an object there is no emotional effect. If you smash the same item but think of it as a subject there is.

But there, subject means "a person" or "a consciousness" or something. (Not to mention that people can often destroy inanimate objects with severe emotional effects regardless of whether they adopt an animistic stance towards the objects destroyed.) When by subject you mean, "The part of a sentence of which the predicate is affirmed or denied," then, well...

The word objectivity exists as the point of view of an object, there is no bias.

I'm not sure what "the point of view of an object" means. Isn't every point of view the point of view of an object? In which case every perspective would be objective...

Kant called them nounema which is to noun as phenomena is to phenom. The problem with nounema is that it is the ambiguous of the ambiguous. You maybe a nounema but so is a ball. You are a subject but you are not an object.

No, they were nouMena, the word for them based on nous or thought. They were "objects of thought" or, more precisely, objects considered only inasmuch as we describe them using only the pure language of thought.

That is not what I meant. I believe the deep reasoning behind the use of morals has to do with the promotion and protection of life. Also, the deep reasoning behind ethics has to do with fairness.

Well, I wouldn't separate morality from ethics like that, and I'd also question whether fairness or protecting life are the first principles of either. But if your disagreement with me here is more just a difference of definition than of belief, well...

Probably in some way. A lot of their differences might just be a matter of talking about different topics while using the same words. Or else the systems they variously describe interact enough so that the same set of conditions that one of these writers associates definitively with a certain emotion is associated with the set of conditions another defines the same emotion with.

If their ideas depend on a set of conditions then they are conditionally right.

But there, subject means "a person" or "a consciousness" or something. (Not to mention that people can often destroy inanimate objects with severe emotional effects regardless of whether they adopt an animistic stance towards the objects destroyed.) When by subject you mean, "The part of a sentence of which the predicate is affirmed or denied," then, well...

...well it is the same thing. Syntax is the arrangement of words as elements in a sentence to show their relationship to one another. The object in the predicate isn't doing the changing. The subject is. Objects have no effect. Subjects do.

I'm not sure what "the point of view of an object" means. Isn't every point of view the point of view of an object? In which case every perspective would be objective...

No, every point of view is not the point of view of an object. Objects have no emotions.

No, they were nouMena, the word for them based on nous or thought. They were "objects of thought" or, more precisely, objects considered only inasmuch as we describe them using only the pure language of thought.

You are right, I stand corrected. I shouldn't discuss Kant.

Well, I wouldn't separate morality from ethics like that, and I'd also question whether fairness or protecting life are the first principles of either. But if your disagreement with me here is more just a difference of definition than of belief, well...

I'm searching for the truth. Otherwise, I'm wrong. Care to start a new thread about that or should I?