I'm working on a hypothesis, which is that certain ontological claims primarily serve epistemological purposes rather than being ontologically informative. All ontological claims serve to constrain epistemology somewhat, but some ontological claims seem to offer little more than epistemological constraint.

Key to my hypothesis is a trend that I have observed for a long time in ontological discussions: ignoring or dismissing the role of ignorance in our knowledge. Metaphorically, what little we each know is like a small rock in a sea of ignorance where undiscovered information swims like so many fish. From our little rocks of knowledge we often throw nets into the water around us, nets beyond which we claim that good fish (valid information) cannot be found. We don't just claim that outside our nets there are no fish worth catching, but that the “fish” that we think we "see" out there are not what they appear to be. In fact, they really are not there at all.

Nets are used to collect things, but this use of our metaphorical nets is to provide a demarcation, a barrier. I have begun to wonder if we throw those nets out to keep ourselves collected preventing us from looking to see whether there really are good fish beyond the nets. Maybe we don't truly believe that there are no fish out there beyond our net barriers. Maybe we actually suspect that they are out there.

Physicalism is a good example. A physicalist draws a line that puts everything he deems to be "physical" within the domain of existence, and which excludes everything from the domain of existence that he deems to be "not physical." That draws an ontological line between what does and doesn't exist, a line that is drawn well beyond the limit of the physicalist's available knowledge and evidence.

The physicalist draws this line drawn prior to examination of evidence that might support or falsify the claim that only "physical" things exist. This predisposes the physicalist to be skeptical of anything "not physical," putting the burden of proof on claims that entail phenomena deemed to be "not physical." However, the physicalist did not impose a similar burden of proof on his own claim that only "physical" things exist. Physicalists regard "not physical" phenomena to be non-existent or imaginary not by virtue of evidential proof, but because they exclude those phenomena from the domain of existence by definition. This constitutes a bias.

I have little interest in criticizing this bias. My interest is to understand why this bias is so attractive and so common.

The physicalist claim does not inform ontological understanding, but rather constrains the domain of valid ontological claims. Not only does it do this largely without evidential support, it serves to restrict the domain of valid evidence that could inform ontological inquiry. Evidence that might challenge or extend the definition of "physical" is disadvantaged because it entails phenomena deemed to be "not physical." Epistemological approaches not rooted in physical observation are considered suspect. This serves to invalidate evidence by designation rather than by observation and investigation. This in turn strengthens the physicalist's bias by skewing his extant body of "valid" evidence through selective inclusion of evidence that reinforces the physicalist claim and selective omission of evidence that might challenge that claim or open it to question. The support that this "validated" body of evidence affords the physicalist claim is somewhat circular, since the criteria for inclusion in it are influenced by the pre-evidential constraint imposed on them by the very claim it has been skewed to support.

There must be some advantages that make adopting this bias worth the costs. My hypothesis is that the advantages are perceived epistemological advantages.

Note: It might be argued that physicalism excludes “not physical” phenomena from the domain of existence on the basis of induction. In other words, all extant evidence supports the claim that “physical” things do exist and no extant evidence supports the existence of “not physical” things, so all that we should expect to exist are “physical” things. This of course entails the problem of induction. Beyond this, though, physicalism overextends itself. Physicalism does not overextend itself with regard to the existence of the “physical” but with regard to the non-existence of the “not physical.” The most that physicalism can say is that we lack evidence supporting the existence of “not physical” things. This is a far cry from saying that we have evidence precluding the existence of “not physical” things.

Physicalism is just one example. I could have mentioned other ontological claims, including theistic claims as well as opposing atheistic claims.

In light of how small our knowledge is compared to that big sea out there just teaming with information that we are still ignorant of, it seems strange to draw hard lines, i.e., constraints, that preclude information discovery in certain predetermined directions or past certain predetermined boundaries. Any such constraints are, of course, made well into areas of our ignorance. Clearly, these constraints are supported by miniscule amounts of knowledge when compared to the abundance of information we have yet to discover. Why do we display such inordinate commitment to these constraints?

Ontological claims such as physicalism are necessary in order to begin thinking at all. We have to start somewhere, after all. My concern isn't the fact that we make such claims or that we make one claim rather than another claim. I am interested in why we are so motivated, once we make them, to cling to these claims as tightly as we do and defend them as tenaciously as we do. Our zeal in doing this seems, in a very real sense, religious.

Provisional claims are one thing. When intelligent people regard their ontological claims as if they were supported evidentially when that "support" is largely a function of circular rationalization, it is puzzling to say the least.

There must be a reason that we do so much of this. I'm looking for that reason.

Any comments?