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sri-Luki wrote:
The one specific relational quality I am having difficulty formalising is that of 'correspondence' between a 'concept' and the thing that this concept 'signifies'... for example, how could one formalise:
'There is some y, such that y is a concept and y has the conceived property of corresponding to an actual thing, x, yet y may or may not correspond to an actual thing, x.'
Well, on the face of it, there doesn't look to be a need for a special kind of operation notated in the above. But maybe that's not what you meant you were looking for. I'll say something about the next quote instead, then.
The difficulty is that it is true of y in one sense (the conceived sense) that it corresponds, but y itself may or may not correspond, similar to the way a picture of a scene is painted as if it actually occurred in reality, but may or may not have actually occurred in reality.
I guess you could say that the person ontologically arguing uses the existential quantifier as a predicate, and that's where he or she goes wrong. The existential quantifier is (roughly, I think) how concepts' having extensions is represented in formal logic nowadays, i.e. (it's not supposed to be a capital "E" but "E" mirrored, to note) Ex(Fx) for, "There is an x such that it is F."
Is this going in the direction you are?
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