Hello all,

I was just wondering whether any budding logicians out there would be able to tell me how intentional states between to variables are usually symbolised, by which I mean propositions of the kind 'x means y', 'x depicts y', 'x believes y' etc. What is the common practice? Symbols for these kinds of relation are not usually included in tables of logical symbols, perhaps there is a reason for that? Or perhaps they are and I just haven't understood. Thus far i've been writing 'x depicts y' as 'xdy'.

Any information would be greatly appreciated.

Here's three articles with some examples of intentional (if that's right word?) operators: plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-action/#StiSag

plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-epistemic/

plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-belief-revision/#RepBelCha

Thanks very much Szavieur. Unfortunately, these articles are all far too technical for me, as I'm not well acquainted with formal logics beyond a layman's understanding. One thing is clear to me, however, that the states I gave as examples 'depicts', 'believes' and 'means' all might have different formal renderings, as each may have be of a different relational type with different logical implications. Hence, I'll be more specific as to what I'm trying to understand.

I am trying to write an essay for a university application and believe it would be beneficial to try and formally state my arguments. The one specific relational quality I am having difficulty formalising is that of 'correspondence' between a 'concept' and the thing that this concept 'signifies'. I think it's a truism that a concept of something is not itself that thing, so that 'a concept of x' is not x, and vice versa. For all concepts, a concept either corresponds to an actual thing, or it does not. Yet it can also be a conceived property of a concept that it does correspond to an actual thing, when it remains that in actuality it either does or does not. For example, I may have a concept of God, and it may be a conceived property of that concept that it corresponds to an actual thing, yet it still stands that that concept may or may not correspond to an actual thing. So, for example, how could one formalise:

'There is some y, such that y is a concept and y has the conceived property of corresponding to an actual thing, x, yet y may or may not correspond to an actual thing, x.'

The difficulty is that it is true of y in one sense (the conceived sense) that it corresponds, but y itself may or may not correspond, similar to the way a picture of a scene is painted as if it actually occurred in reality, but may or may not have actually occurred in reality.

If anyone could spell it out to me as if I knew as much formal logic as an ant, I would be very grateful.

"For all concepts, a concept either corresponds to an actual thing, or it does not. " This first assumption should not be counted on in Realism for the true expectation of appropriate actions of a by an intentional mind (of sorts) should not be conceived in correspondence to anything but the thing there and then appropriately to DO(the believing of such is or is not the knowing). The concept is considered faulty in itself because it just won't do for something actually and appropriately attempted at being DONE.

But I believe the test was at some idealism for regarding the appearance of things. No?

sri-Luki wrote:
Yet it can also be a conceived property of a concept that it does correspond to an actual thing, when it remains that in actuality it either does or does not. For example, I may have a concept of God, and it may be a conceived property of that concept that it corresponds to an actual thing, yet it still stands that that concept may or may not correspond to an actual thing.

I'm not entirely sure that I'm skilled enough to help you, but if I can, before I try, anyway, this quote makes it sound like you're referring to the ontological argument for God's existence. Are you?

Hm. I'm not sure I understand you sophic.

If I have a concept, that concept either corresponds to an actual thing or it does not, whether or not it is 'conceived in correspondence to anything' is irrelevant to whether it does correspond to anything.

If 'For all concepts, a concept either corresponds to an actual thing, or it does not.' is an assumption, then presumably 'For all paintings, a painting either depicts an actual thing or it does not.' is also an assumption (assuming the analogy holds!).

I'm afraid you'll have to be a little clearer in explaining to me how this could be wrong.