Yada wrote:

I applaud you for attempting to discuss philosophy here.

I don't usually do morality/ethics, nor have I done much thinking on the subject. So, you'll have to excuse me for the likely possibility that I am totally off in my reactions. However, your posts raise a number of questions in my mind.

You seem to be saying that morality ought to necessarily follow from what *is*. In one sense I can appreciate that the premises of any philosophy ought to include what *is*. Otherwise, what would be the point of the analysis? In another sense, I cannot place what *is* as being singular and universal (for at least our species), so that moral realism would be a possibility. At the very least, I see three approaches: the subjective, the relative (to groups, for example), and that which is uniquely human.

Thank you for your expressed appreciation Yada.

My intent is to rely upon self-evident universal truthes that can be established without depending upon transcendental grounds. Everything empirically human. I am not saying that morality ought to follow from what is. It is more like an attempt to establish morality as what is, rather than what ought to be, through satisfying every imaginable case. Sorta like linguistically satisfying Godel's Completeness Theorem. Moral realism is the closest 'ism' I could find that resembled, or at least offered, a legitimate place for my own thoughts on morality.

Does that help you to understand my aim here?

creativesoul wrote:
My intent is to rely upon self-evident universal truths that can be established without depending upon transcendental grounds. Everything empirically human. I am not saying that morality ought to follow from what is.

It is more like an attempt to establish morality as what is, rather than what ought to be, through satisfying every imaginable case.
At first blush, to me that seems to be along naturalistic, rather than stricly rational lines. Empirically, there is morality everywhere, and lack of it as well. Even other species of animals have distinct morality that is part of the characteristics of each species (I won't back this up). So it would appear that human morality is at least partially innate, which part should be self-evidently true. But for people, society is also part of reality, and each society superposes its randomly evolved customs over what we would naturally be inclined to do. So while native morality is subject to realist, universal morality, society adds a relative element that can provide surprises.

Classically, there were huge differences between the Athenian and Spartan cultures. What was acceptable, even required in one was abhorent to the other. This was one of the reasons for mutual dislike and conflict between the two.

How would one go about separating the innate from the superposed? I suppose comparative surveys would be illuminating. On the negative side. If all cultures have the same moral behavior, then that behavior is universal. The differences are cultural. But I don't think that this is a philosophical approach, but more a Humean one.

But to answer your question, I am sure that I still don't get it. I just might not be cut out to think this way.

Yada wrote:

Kant's ethics are usually trashed on the basis that specific unique applications lead to absurd consequences. These critics are confused by the above dilemma. Kant devised universal ethics based on what necessarily followed from his ordinary premises. The critics cherry-pick particular circumstances far removed from the universal, then say, "see, it doesn't work".

Critics are valuable. It is hard to be critical of that which cannot be imagined to be otherwise.

As I mentioned elsewhere, I'm also looking at Plato's Parmenides which is the only place I know of that he attempts to establish and critique his own theory of ideas (elsewhere, he just takes them for granted). In it, in typical Plato fashion, he has Zeno affirming a realist stance and from that, a necessary consequence that seemed easy for Plato/Socrates to refute. Zeno claimed that for things to be many rather than one they would have to be both like and unlike, which is a contradiction. Socrates retorts that things are actually both like and unlike over time or in varying relations! Relative to A things can be alike, but relative to B they might not be. His solution: Forms, which are truly universal.

Interesting. Plato's "Forms" may be similar to what I am envisioning concerning morality.

It is my opinion that morality is behavioral expectation, and thus constitutes being a necessary developmental trait/condition that has been incorrectly framed in thought throughout history as moral belief about behavioral expectation(morality). I am actively seeking the universally shared objective common denominator(s) that can be identified and demonstrated as constituting a necessary and universal account of all human behavioral expectation, prior to adopting and/or developing an individual worldview.

It would completely redefine what constitutes being a moral issue. Should I be fortunate enough to be able to make an undeniably sound argument, I can imagine many would find reason to oppose what would necessarily follow... but that is my aim.

creativesoul wrote:

My intent is to rely upon self-evident universal truths that can be established without depending upon transcendental grounds. Everything empirically human. I am not saying that morality ought to follow from what is.

It is more like an attempt to establish morality as what is, rather than what ought to be, through satisfying every imaginable case.

Yada wrote:

At first blush, to me that seems to be along naturalistic, rather than strictly rational lines. Empirically, there is morality everywhere, and lack of it as well. Even other species of animals have distinct morality that is part of the characteristics of each species (I won't back this up). So it would appear that human morality is at least partially innate, which part should be self-evidently true. But for people, society is also part of reality, and each society superposes its randomly evolved customs over what we would naturally be inclined to do. So while native morality is subject to realist, universal morality, society adds a relative element that can provide surprises.

Classically, there were huge differences between the Athenian and Spartan cultures. What was acceptable, even required in one was abhorent to the other. This was one of the reasons for mutual dislike and conflict between the two.

These common 'moral' issues, in my eyes at least, are most often a case of mistaken identity that is a direct result of how morality has been thought about throughout our written history. Even here the pattern continues, for the framework is layed out post-worldview. It is talk about moral belief. I hold that moral belief and morality are not the same thing. I argued earlier that morality is instantiated - is able to be known to exist - prior to learning a common language, therefore necessarily prior to our having adopted belief. Moral belief is adopted belief.

How would one go about separating the innate from the superposed? I suppose comparative surveys would be illuminating. On the negative side. If all cultures have the same moral behavior, then that behavior is universal. The differences are cultural. But I don't think that this is a philosophical approach, but more a Humean one.

I am unsure what approach I have, and it very well may be a Humean approach. It is more likely a combination. The importance to me, is offering an undeniably sound case for the re-identification of morality through logical demonstration. I have long thought that the knowledge needed to reassess morality is available but was simply being neglected. This question you ask is extremely relevent though, and constitutes one of my initial concerns when first contemplating how to go about constructing an argument.

In order to separate the innate from the superposed, one must first identify and make the necessary distinction between the two. We can identify the innate through establishing the universally shared common denominators that must exist prior to adopting belief. In doing so one satisfies this request. How effectively that is done is what I am intent upon showing as undeniably true. After the distinction is shown, one must then further identify and distinguish the individual elements which, when combined, constitute one's innate behavioral expectation(morality). This needs to be shown as extant prior to having developed moral belief, or any adopted belief at all. If those things can be shown as being necessary for our having the ability to learn, regardless of what we are learning, it would necessarily entail learning moral belief. This presupposes that humans are born void of belief/knowledge, but proves morality(universal behavioral expectation) is innately intact.

Yada wrote:

But to answer your question, I am sure that I still don't get it. I just might not be cut out to think this way.

Your kindness is remarkable. To borrow from Witt, the truth of the matter is this... if I cannot put it into sensible terms for you, evidently I am not cut out to think this way.

Seeing how my argument thus far establishes(I think) our innately trusting another to tell the truth about the world around us through common language as a necessary and integral part of universal morality...

How many different ways are there to tell the truth?

How do we most reliably establish what constitutes being true?

"How would one go about separating the innate from the superposed? I suppose comparative surveys would be illuminating. On the negative side. If all cultures have the same moral behavior, then that behavior is universal. The differences are cultural. But I don't think that this is a philosophical approach, but more a Humean one."


Just read and find out. It's a universal Self-consciousness which you are apprehending as an innate. The innate is more than self-consciousness per Infinity. It is indeed something hard to believe as finitely reasoned as NOT observed but empirical. Is infinity itself empirical or a pure rational judgment?