Curious to see this engaged in thought here.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/

Can moral statements be true?

I find certain difficulty here. I suppose the first thing needing to be established when assessing morality and/or moral claims would be what constitutes being a moral claim. I mean, the following are considered to be moral claims by many, if not most.

1.) Murder is wrong.
2.) Sharing is good.
3.) Jesus should not have overturned the moneychangers' table.
4.) One should follow the rules.
5.) Human sacrifice is evil.
6.) Being dishonest is bad.
7.) Honesty is a virtue.

These commonly held claims all contain the element of the utterer's behavioral expectation(s). To say murder is wrong, is to say that one should not commit the act of murder. These all are expressions of belief about behavior, aren't they? Is it incorrect of me then to presuppose that one could place the terms "I believe.." in front of each of these in order to more accurately represent what's going on here?

We witness a personal value assessment in what is commonly thought of as a moral claim. I personally question whether the above examples capture morality. I am thinking that perhaps they display something quite different. I mean these things are assertions stemming from pre-existing belief, and they presuppose the truth of their grounds, don't they?

I found this section of the SEP article rather compelling...

4. Epistemology

Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that there are moral facts. Suppose even that the moral facts are properly thought of as at least compatible with science. One thing Moore’s Open Question Argument still seems to show is that no appeal to natural facts discovered by scientific method would establish that the moral facts are one way rather than another. That something is pleasant, or useful, or satisfies someone’s preference, is perfectly compatible with thinking that it is neither good nor right nor worth doing. The mere fact that moral facts might be compatible with natural facts does nothing to support the idea that we could learn about the moral facts. David Hume seems to have been, in effect, pressing this point long before Moore, when he argued that no moral conclusion follows non-problematically from nonmoral premises (Hume 1739). No “ought,” he pointed out, followed from an “is”—without the help of another (presupposed) “ought.” More generally, there is no valid inference from nonmoral premises to moral conclusions unless one relies, at least surreptitiously, on a moral premise. If, then, all that science can establish is what “is” and not what ought to be, science cannot alone establish moral conclusions.

But from where, then, can we get the moral premises needed? Of course no answer is to be found in a claim that certain norms are in force or that a powerful being commanded something since, in both cases, nothing about what ought to be done follows from these claims without assuming some further moral claim (e.g. that one ought to obey the norms in force or that one owes allegiance to the powerful being). If at least some fundamental moral principles were self-evident, or analytic truths, or at least reasonably thought to enjoy widespread consensus or to be such that eventually all would converge on those principles, there might be some plausible candidates. Yet the few principles that might be candidates—one ought to treat people with respect or one ought to promote human welfare or, other things equal, pleasure is good—are all either so abstract or inspecific in their implications that they could hardly alone work to justify the full range of moral claims people are inclined to make.

These considerations highlight a crucial difficulty moral realists face even if one grants the existence of moral facts: they need some account of how we might justify our moral claims. Otherwise, whatever the moral facts are, we would have reasonable grounds for worrying that what we count as evidence for any particular claim is no evidence at all.

The SEP article, especially concerning the above section, highlights(in my eyes at least) and revolves around what I believe is the most significant problem at hand regarding an assessment of 'morality', although the article itself has a different, albeit rather conventional... aim. Establishing that the common thinking about what constitutes morality *is* really a case of mistaken identity effectively moves it out from under the guillotine's domain if it can be done without violating the problems Hume demonstrated. This case of mistaken identity has necessarily embedded all moral conversation into terms of ought.

For instance it offers up as acceptable forms of justification, self-evident and/or analytic truthes, but in doing so also wrongfully aligns morality, itself, within the domain of Hume's guillotine. While I will not argue against the idea that the most commonly held beliefs about 'morality' are displayed through ought statements and/or conclusions of 'good/bad' and 'right/wrong', I will argue that those belief(s) about morality are invalidly inferred from what *is* self-evident and/or analytic truth, and therefore are not morality-based at all.

Again, the problem I wish to highlight *is* how morality has been thought about, and that this case of mistaken identity is being furthered by common convention, as is clearly being displayed here...

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/

I find these distinctions rather arbitrary, and crawling ever deeper into the subjective rabbit hole. I see no relevent distinction here, at least not relevent in the sense of necessarily following from what *is*. Once again, all of these so-called moral constructs have - at their root - moral belief about behavioral expectation. That *is* moral belief about morality itself. Common convention is but behavioral expectation based upon pre-existing belief. I assert that that is not an appropriate definition of morality itself, because those descriptions do not entail the essence of behavioral expectation.

In order to establish that I must first establish the necessary distinctions between the essential nature of belief and the essential nature of morality(behavioral expectation). Belief is established through one's drawing a conclusion about something. If moral belief is a conclusion about expectation of another's behavior after belief has been established, then moral belief and morality are not the same thing. It can be established that one necessarily has pre-existing behavioral expectation prior to having individual moral belief - as common convention holds moral belief to be - because one must learn common language prior to developing conventional moral belief. In order to learn common language, one instantiates morality through necessarily trusting(expectation of another's behavior) that the person doing the teaching is telling the truth. We necessarily believe that what we are being taught through common language, about the world around us, is true. We therefore, must conclude that morality is intrinsically within us because it is clearly shown to exist prior to our possessing any adopted belief. Adopted belief entails that which is commonly called moral belief. Moral belief is not necessarily based upon intrinsic and essential morality, but convention treats it all in the same manner.

If at least some fundamental moral principles were self-evident, or analytic truths, or at least reasonably thought to enjoy widespread consensus or to be such that eventually all would converge on those principles, there might be some plausible candidates. Yet the few principles that might be candidates—one ought to treat people with respect or one ought to promote human welfare or, other things equal, pleasure is good—are all either so abstract or inspecific in their implications that they could hardly alone work to justify the full range of moral claims people are inclined to make.

Why must "a principle" be established that satisfies this?

One need not justify "...the full range of moral claims people are inclined to make..." in order to satisfy being a universally applicable self-evident truth, so I then must wonder... Why should one principle need to be able to justify those things?

What if some of these so-called 'moral' claims are not moral claims at all?

From here, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morali...efinition/#NorDefMor

Comes this:

2. Normative Definitions of “morality”

When “morality” is used in its universal normative sense, it need not have either of the two features that are essential to moralities referred to by the original descriptive sense: that it be a code of conduct that is put forward by a society and that it be accepted as a guide to behavior by the members of that society. Indeed, it is possible that “morality” in the normative sense has never been put forward by any particular society, by any group at all, or even by any individual who regards it as overriding. “Morality” is thus an ambiguous word; the two essential features cited above, which are present in everything that is referred to by the original descriptive sense are not present when “morality” is used in its normative sense. The only feature that the descriptive and normative senses of “morality” have in common is that they refer to guides to behavior that involve, at least in part, avoiding and preventing harm to some others.

Those who claim that there is a universal code of conduct that all rational persons would put forward for governing the behavior of all moral agents need not hold that every society has a code of conduct that has those features that they claim morality must have. They can admit that the guides to behavior of some societies lack so many of the essential features of morality in the normative sense that it is incorrect to say that these societies even have a morality in a descriptive sense. They can also admit that many, perhaps all, societies have defective moralities, that although their guides to behavior have enough of the features of normative morality to be classified as descriptive moralities, they could not be put forward in their entirety by all rational persons.

I want to examine and discuss these parts, in particular...

If morality is to be "overriding" in an all inclusive sense, it demands universal adherence. 'Ought statements' have no such value. Since we are talking about morality, and it is commonly thought of as an "ambiguous word", that framework presents difficulties - in and of itself. I contend that the ambiguity has been fostered through historical use of the language describing it, and that this mistake has been furthered by common convention. The ambiguity is had by how morality has been and is being framed in thought. The problem is how we are thinking about it. Morality, as common convention has it, is conclusion(belief) based. Indeed, it is not a talk about morality at all, it is talking belief about morality.

As mentioned earlier, an 'ought statement' always presupposes negative consequences. That alone brings about the historical element of consequence, the belief in God factor. Although many still adhere to that kind of motivation, times have since changed, and many do not. Since there are significant differences in opinion of what constitutes sufficient reason/motivation to act in a given manner, and there are individually established subjective 'degrees' of 'good and bad' which describe that manner and it's effects, we have come to see utilitarianism as perhaps the most useful method of compromise through establishing the 'greatest good' via means of equal consideration of many. That most certainly seems to be the most reasonable method to approach morality, at least as it has been historically and currently framed in thought... as alluded to above.

Hume's guillotine had such a relevent impact upon thinking about the common conception of morality. Because of the espoused relationship between is and ought, we must give equal respect and consideration to as many different individual sets of moral belief systems as possible because of the fact that none have any greater proof in grounding than another. While that is true of 'oughts', it does not address morality as I see it. It is a case of mistaken identity neessarily followed by a mistaken path. Morality and moral belief are not the same thing. As soon as the talk involves revolving around moral belief, the focus is irrelevent to establishing what constitutes morality and therefore equally irrelevent in establishing what constitutes a moral claim.

As the earlier SEP article noted, there exists much disagreement about what kinds of claims constitute being moral claims. It is my intent to utilize Hume's guillotine in order to behead the misconception of 'morality' from that which can be demonstrated to be the universally shared behavioral expectation of trusting another to tell the truth... one element of the universal form - morality. This natural form of morality demands the head of moral belief be severed from morality itself. Clearly showing that the common conception of morality *is* a misconception provides a different structural framework from which we can more accurately contemplate morality and what follows from it.

The sharp distinction between belief and fact plays a pivotal role here. Moral belief is not fact and does not necessarily follow from fact, nor vice-versa. That is one part of the moral language problem that Hume clearly displayed. When different persons from different backgrounds assess the same behavioral scenario they do it from their own very personal and subjective belief system(necessarily so), and therefore often come to oppositional conclusions of 'right and wrong' and 'good and bad'. This is a necessary result of the direct influence that prior belief about morality has upon one's current worldview. Moral belief is conclusion based, and is necessarily held as true in the believer. It comes after the initial belief system has been formed and often translates into 'ought statements'. Morality is instantiated via the universally applicable and objectively demonstrable intrinsic trait which all humans have in common regarding behavioral expectation prior to the formation of a moral belief system.

Human morality is established by recognizing the fact that all who share common language must naturally believe/expect and therefore necessarily trust that the teachers of that language are accurately describing the world around them. We believe what they say, because we have no choice in the matter. We do not know any better. We trust that what we are being taught is true, because we have no prior belief system and thus, no ability to doubt the teachings. Therefore all understanding/belief systems necessitate trusting another and it necessarily follows that we are trusting another to tell the truth. To say "I believe X" necessarily means "I believe X is true."

One cannot imagine our having the ability to learn a common language without necessarily trusting that the teacher of that language is telling the truth. We can know this because we must think/believe so in order to even be able to accept the teachings. We accept that the teaching is an accurate representation of reality; we accept that it is true. That does not mean that we have an accurate understanding of what truth *is*. It means that through trusting another to accurately represent the world around us through common language, we necessarily reveal the concept of truth as being a necessary part of our understanding, as being of first order importance.

We obviously accept the teachings are true because we come to understand what the terms mean and refer to. We then must think/believe that those terms accurately reflect the world around us. Thus truth is an integral part of language. Truth is the value one gives to a statement that they believe accurately corresponds to reality. We necessarily place truth value upon what we first learn, because it is the basis of our reference to the world around us. It is when an apparent contradiction between prior belief and current experience is had in life experience that truth is first consciously entertained. Prior to that is it assumed.

Warrant *is* the measure by which one establishes that which constitutes sufficient reason to believe that something is true. It is an individual measure of sufficiency and relevency in the determination of truth and it reflects conviction. We all share the exact same measure of warrant when first learning a common language. Prior to the ability to doubt, which is necessarily grounded in prior belief, our warrant is trusting in the words of the teacher. We must assume that - without even knowing that we are doing it - the teacher is being truthful. Thus, there is an important role that the teacher of language plays in a person's belief system. Our trust in their truthfulness warrants our believing whatever they say... at least up until apparant contradiction.

During contradiction between current experience and prior belief, one must assess the situation according to what has been previously accepted as true. One's belief system affects one's thoughts about current experience. How one thinks about the world around them constitutes the belief system. Because it is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood, we all hold that our beliefs are true. In the face of apparent contradiction, in some manner or another, one must rely upon their own pre-existing belief system. It is here that conviction begins to be accrued. What is thought of as the most important belief often takes precedence over all others here. That belief is not necessarily true. Because conviction is the amount of confidence that one places upon a belief, and because to believe something *is* to believe it is true, it is at times like this that truth can be distorted into something other than a property of language.

Again, history(specifically organized religion) has muddled the term truth to the extent that one must wonder what it means should they not realize that it is but a value given to a statement which can be shown to accurately correspond to reality. Truth is not 'out there' to be found, it is an element of language.

While my focus thus far has been upon showing how the language aspect of adopted belief reveals the concept of truth as a necessary element of first order importance in morality through the development of one's understanding/belief system, morality is not captured by truth and truth alone. Morality is all about behavioral expectation. Universally speaking, this reveals our necessarily trusting another, and truth does not entail trust. It is just one element of what we must trust another with. Trusting another entails more. We trust others in different ways than just being truthful in language.

Do these other ways converge upon truth as well?

creativesoul wrote: I see no relevent distinction here, at least not relevent in the sense of necessarily following from what *is*. Once again, all of these so-called moral constructs have - at their root -
moral belief about behavioral expectation. That *is* moral belief about morality itself.
Common convention is but behavioral expectation based upon pre-existing belief. I assert that that is not an appropriate definition of morality itself, because those descriptions do not entail the essence of behavioral expectation.

In order to establish that I must first establish the necessary distinctions between the essential nature of belief and the essential nature of morality(behavioral expectation). Belief is established through one's drawing a conclusion about something. If moral belief is a conclusion about expectation of another's behavior after belief has been established, then moral belief and morality are not the same thing. It can be established that one necessarily has pre-existing behavioral expectation prior to having individual moral belief - as common convention holds moral belief to be - because one must learn common language prior to developing conventional moral belief. In order to learn common language, one instantiates morality through necessarily trusting(expectation of another's behavior) that the person doing the teaching is telling the truth. We necessarily believe that what we are being taught through common language, about the world around us, is true. We therefore, must conclude that morality is intrinsically within us because it is clearly shown to exist prior to our possessing any adopted belief. Adopted belief entails that which is commonly called moral belief. Moral belief is not necessarily based upon intrinsic and essential morality, but convention treats it all in the same manner.

I applaud you for attempting to discuss philosophy here.

I don't usually do morality/ethics, nor have I done much thinking on the subject. So, you'll have to excuse me for the likely possibility that I am totally off in my reactions. However, your posts raise a number of questions in my mind.

You seem to be saying that morality ought to necessarily follow from what *is*. In one sense I can appreciate that the premises of any philosophy ought to include what *is*. Otherwise, what would be the point of the analysis? In another sense, I cannot place what *is* as being singular and universal (for at least our species), so that moral realism would be a possibility. At the very least, I see three approaches: the subjective, the relative (to groups, for example), and that which is uniquely human.

Kant's ethics are usually trashed on the basis that specific unique applications lead to absurd consequences. These critics are confused by the above dilemma. Kant devised universal ethics based on what necessarily followed from his ordinary premises. The critics cherry-pick particular circumstances far removed from the universal, then say, "see, it doesn't work".

As I mentioned elsewhere, I'm also looking at Plato's Parmenides which is the only place I know of that he attempts to establish and critique his own theory of ideas (elsewhere, he just takes them for granted). In it, in typical Plato fashion, he has Zeno affirming a realist stance and from that, a necessary consequence that seemed easy for Plato/Socrates to refute. Zeno claimed that for things to be many rather than one they would have to be both like and unlike, which is a contradiction. Socrates retorts that things are actually both like and unlike over time or in varying relations! Relative to A things can be alike, but relative to B they might not be. His solution: Forms, which are truly universal.

Edit: last paragraph