neither/nor wrote:

Ironically, what is truly categorical and imperative in this world is the golden rule: Them that's got the gold, rule.

The only way you could do this would be to really not understand what a categorical imperative is, and to be really shallow in your apparently phenomenological consideration of the world. Aesthetics is a larger drive than money, and the good life contains that as a component.

Also, a number of posts ago I feel like I may have addressed a number of your concerns. It was worth writing it even if you don't read it, but I think that you may find it potentially handy since I find your discussion to be going nowhere. (and neither you nor (lol) Szavieur seem to be discussing things in the spirit of agreement - it has been hostile for some time now.)

neither/nor wrote:
I can live with that. There's that part "deduced" up in the clouds of abstractions and that part "lived" down here on the ground. The two are not antitethical, of course. But they really do speak different languages---for all practical purposes.

I'd like to take issue with thinking that thinking abstractly is a way to try to live in some transcendent world. When I look at Pride and Prejudice and think of it as a book and then as a physical object, I'm describing it in increasingly general or abstract terms. But it's still Pride and Prejudice that I'm talking about, not the Form of Writing.

You seem to [treat a complexity as if it were a "Thing"] with "Dasein," though.

But I don't. I simply make commonsensical observations:

1] we are all born ["thrown"---purely adventitiously] into different historical, cultural, demographic contexts; 2] we are all taught as children to view the world around us in accordance with how these countervailing contexts reflect on behaviors said to be obligatory; 3] we all have uniquely personal experiences that bring us into contact with variables that profoundly shape our sense of reality---moral and otherwise.

You packed that huge block of information into the single word Dasein, which is similar to Erosopher's use of the word a priori, though, right?

Moreover, (1) is pragmatically false (I mean in terms of the semantic/pragmatic distinction in linguistics). Not only is there a lot of difference between everyone's contexts: there are important similarities, too.

Wrong in what sense though? How is it wrong from the perspective of an a priori knowledge he might have had? How does this knowledge overlap yours and mine? Are all bombs dropped in all wars, irrespective of the existential parameters of the conflicts, necessarily wrong? How would this be demonstrated in the manner in which it can be clearly demonstrated that all wars involve the killing of innocent civilians?

Wrong as in shouldn't be done? Contrary to the Moral Law? Even if it's "just an abstract scaffolding" or whatever, it IS something, and things can be compared to it and shown to be consistent or not with it. Now if this scaffolding doesn't exist in your head, well, I guess no conclusion built on it will find support in your head then, either. But it really is in mine and so it makes MY moral judgments true or false in the way that I think they're true or false.

But now back to how this might just be me "rationalizing" (what does that even MEAN?) the world in order to comfort myself: HOW does a string of words justified by other words (supposing that's all my abstraction amounts to in the end) provide me with EMOTIONAL solace?

And some of them may even rationalize that by quoting Kant.

I know. Or Nietzsche, Heidegger, Ayn Rand, Gandhi, tea leaves, gut reactions, the theory of evolution, Jesus Christ, territorial claims, vengeance, ivory tusks, salt, weaponry, whatever. And each more or less as easily invoked to support murder as any of the others.

It's very, very, very simple to go from, "I have no obligation not to commit mass murder," to, "So I'm just going to go commit mass murder." Even if the concept of duty more readily serves perpetrators of democide than tea reading does, well, disbelief in the application of that concept also can serve them very well. So there's no pragmatic reason for me to opt for the one over the other, it seems (if my goal is to avert democide).

neither/nor original post:

I am waiting for him or her to flesh out the behaviors he or she chose noting the a priori knowledge utilized to arrive at behaviors said to reflect a moral obligation.

szavieur wrote:

I've given you a lot of examples of how to apply Kantian ethics to real life. If you don't understand the examples, well, your reading comprehension skills or lack thereof are pretty much your own problem at this point. My only extra attempt to explain myself here will be by discussing how I've dealt with suicidal ideation.

To the best of my recollection, you have given me examples that were embedded in EXTREMELY personal interactions---conflicts that few of us have ever experienced personally ourselves.

Nor I do not recall you fleshing them out such that you established an a priori knowledge all of us would then be able to integrate into our own behavioral choices.

This is why I come back time and again to moral conflicts more generally shared. Most of us have experienced [or know folks who have experienced] moral conflicts that swirl around issues like abortion or stem cell reasearch or gun control or capital punishment or the moral and political disputes relating to the role of government in our lives, economic and foreign policy, health care issues etc. It is when we talk about obligatory behaviors here that nothing is ever really pinned down philosophically. These are the big black newspaper headline confrontations that never deliver behaviors that can be shown to be the most rational of all.

Here is your own approach however:

Lots of things in the world are causes with effects. Relative to us, they might only be causes of effects that we want. But free will's not like that. It's more than just a link in the chain of means and ends. Respecting it means giving it priority over our desires when it comes to questions like whether to live. Killing myself just to stop myself being unhappy would not be that kind of respect; it would be its opposite. So when I'm depressed or sad or whatever, offing myself just to end everything would be wrong. And it's right for me to live, then (I have a partial obligation to survive).

Jesus.

I am trying to relate these abstractions to my own life....to my own existential encounters with suicide. Real suicide. Not "suicidal ideation". I have a post-vietnam scar on my left wrist that reminds me ever so vividly how irrelevant theoretical arguments like yours are.

It is as though you are attempting to "capture" philosophically an a priori knowledge we can all make use of ourselves if and when we are confronting "in reality" thoughts and feelings that tug us toward ending it all.

What in the world however do you KNOW about real suicide? Do you actually imagine Kant is relevant here for those who are faced with pain and suffering Kant knew nothing about?

And even if you [or Kant] did experience suicide eyeball to eyeball there is no way it could ever be close to overlapping my own excruciating turmoil.

Philosophy and suicide?!! Philosophy can't even objectify conflicting arguments [and behaviors] we have about eating meat.

There's no magical categorical imperative formula that can absolutely prove that everyone faced with X should do Y when X and Y are concretely described circumstances and actions, but that doesn't mean that the formulations that do exist are unjustified.

What particular formulations? Aimed to prescribe or proscribe what particular behaviors? What particular formulations are justified and not justified when we are discussing, say, sexual love between an adult and a child? You say, "[o]nly the generalization is supposed to be arrived at [here] transcendentally."

What generalizations can we arrive at transcendentally with respect to John, 19, who is having a consensual sexual relationship with Jane, 14? Suppose Jane is extremely precocious for her age and knows exactly what she is agreeing to. Is this still "immoral"?

Can we know this philosophically? Can we know this a priori? And if we can't then we are forced to grapple with each separate realtionship in each unique and separate circumstantial context. Indeed, that is why, with respect to moral issues like this, the law must be a bludgeon rather than a scalpel.

I am trying to relate these abstractions to my own life....to my own existential encounters with suicide. Real suicide. Not "suicidal ideation". I have a post-vietnam scar on my left wrist that reminds me ever so vividly how irrelevant theoretical arguments like yours are.


You know how the "a priori" and the shared fail, especially when
the shared experience breaks down. Your experience seems undeniable,
not least because thousands shared similar consequences. I'm not sure
you are arguing against someone who is pushing Kant as infallible,
though. Kant makes interesting models of thought. He only ever made
a few faint scratches in the world of Psychology, though.

I don't think Kant is connected enough to the real and the now
to help you deal with realities that were carefully screened out.
There are others who connect awful and real things to matters
of the mind (besides regular Psycologists). Many of them consider
mythology and such. It tends to be more timeless and deal with
harder questions.

But Philosophy doesn't reach into that area...it's more focused.
It has a job...but not that one, and a contemporary Philosopher
might be a bit more on-target with the Epistemology. But, still:
It is what it is. I could see a dermatologist for a toothache,
but what could he remember?

erosopher wrote:

....a judgment being universal merely refers to the form of the judgment.

"All cars have four wheels" is a (false) universal judgment, since it applies to all cars, while if I say, "this car has four wheels", it is a particular judgment. All judgments are made by an individual, with that individuals own concepts in mind.

I'm more intrigued by other judgments, however. For example, "all cars should get 100 miles to the gallon", or, "all cars should be manufactured by union labor", or "all cars should be banned from use in downtown areas", or, "all cars should have triple the safety features they have now".

These would make for significantly more interesting discussions about rational and irrational human behavior.

First, that the moral judgment refers to all cases of that maxim. It isn't only this murder that is wrong, but all murder, for example. This is most relevant to Mary dealing with her own problem herself.

And how do we establish whether any particular abortion is or is not something a woman should be charged with murder for obtaining? Are all abortions interchangable with respect to this legal penalty? How about abortions that resulted from rape or incest? After all, it wasn't the fetus's fault that its very existence resulted from the terrible choices that others made.

Can we read Kant and establish whether Mary should be charged with murder or not?

Second, that this moral judgment is made by a rational agent (we only understand rational agent through our one example, ourselves). Insofar as we see other people as rational agents that are the same as us (that are also humans) we demand that these agents follow the same maxims that we hold.

Can you imagine a plethora of political factions [the ususal suspects] sitting down and discussing... with respect to abortion...what constitutes rational and irrational behavior? What in the world does a "rational agent" do that an irrational agent would not?

And using what you construe to be a priori knowledge, why don't you delineate what a rational agent should do if confronted with an unwanted pregnancy. And if that's up to Mary, what happens when those who arrest her and charge her with murder insist this too "was up to them"?

You enjoy invoking Dasein, and with it Heidegger.

Actually, as you can imagine, I could not care less what Heidegger MEANT by dasein. I can only speculate about what I thought he meant. My dasein, as it were. And I thought he meant this:

Re my post to szavieur above:

1]

that we are all born ["thrown"---purely adventitiously] into very different historical, cultura and demographic contexts

2]

that we are all taught as children to view the world around us in accordance with how these countervailing circumstantial contexts reflect on behaviors said to be obligatory

3]

that we all have uniquely personal experiences that bring us into contact with variables that profoundly shape our own sense reality---moral and otherwise

And that this "sense of reality----moral and otherwise" is always subject to change [sometimes tumultuous change] without notice. But: Change for the obsetrician is very different from change for the ethicist.

Speaking for myself, I would say that the word transcend is incorrect to use here. Transcendental philosophy is an enabling. Fundamental Ontology is our fundamental ways of Being, such as Being-In-The-World. Transcendental Philosophy lays a groundwork for this by assuring us of the ways in which we must think. All of fundamental ontology can be found in Kant as well, but Kant is engaged in the problems of his own situation

Again, from my own unique and personal perspective, these are words used to define and defend other words while making not a single reference to any particular behaviors that will be judged moral or immoral by those who situate them in their own particular worlds; and situate them in very conflicting and contradictory ways. And Kant is no less impotent than, say, Plato when his theoretical constructs collide with the gritty, grimey and sometimes very, very grim reality of actual human relationships.

Theoretical philosophy often falls apart at the seams with respect to actual [very much daunting] human behavior. And in ways that theoretical physics does not with respect to matter that extists without mind.

neither/nor original post:

Ironically, what is truly categorical and imperative in this world is the golden rule: Them that's got the gold, rule.

erosopher wrote:

The only way you could do this would be to really not understand what a categorical imperative is...

But I don't want to know what a categorical imperative IS. I want to know how a Kantian uses this component of a theoretical description of the Moral Law to aid and abet folks who are struggling to put moral prescriptions and proscriptions into laws that treat all of us as ends and not just as means to an end.

Out in the real world those with political and economic power make certain they can use as many of us as possible towards the end of accummulating all the more the gold that allows them to buy institutions [like the Congress and the White House] that perpetuate political and economic relationships that have infuriated so many millions of folks on Main Street over the past couple of years.

Is Kant brought up on K Street? at the Bilderberg meetings? in the Council on Foreign Relations? at the Trilateral Commission? in the boardrooms of those who own and operate the military industrial complex? Maybe. But I suspect it's not your father's or your grandfather's Kant. ; o )

.....I find your discussion to be going nowhere. (and neither you nor (lol) Szavieur seem to be discussing things in the spirit of agreement - it has been hostile for some time now.)

Actually, I find my discussion is rather hell bent on going places your own discussion tends to avoid. See, for example, my race car metaphor.

Personally, I don't want to understand Kant. I want those who claim to understand him to offer convincing arguments that he is relevant to the moral and political discussions and debates we struggle fiercely with day after day---in our families, in our communities, in our government.

But years have become decades have become centuries have become millenia and we resolve virtually nothing with respect to What Is The Right Thing To Do about....

Just fill in the blank with any one of hundreds and hundreds of perennial conflicts.

And my point [ironically] is that not being able to resolve them is actually the good news. Once we acknowledge this we can concentrate more on moderating our views and aiming to negociate our differences into legislation that is bursting at the seams with all the compromises necessary to accomodate different sets of value judgments. Only then will we be willing to moderate our behaviors in turn.

And what you see as hostility, I see as polemics. I do tend to be provocative at times. That's true. I find that when the best minds are provoked they work a little harder in rebuttal. But I never mean to convey my point of view as a personal attack. If you or szavieur [or anyone] react to my occasional barbs as ad hominems I apologize. It is not my intention to go that route.

I just like an exchange that, well, transcends the sort of stuff you read in academic venues. My aim, in other wrods, is never to Sound Like A Philosopher, but to bring philosophy itself down to earth.

And it's always a lot more colorful down here anyway, right? ; o )