"Okay, but what does this have to do with Kant's concept of radical evil?"


What does Kant's concept of radical evil have to do with actual human interactions deemed to be either good or evil? That's my point. I'm trying to situate philosophical assessments of human behavior such that they can be defended [or not] once the language is forced to come to terms with the actual consequences of particual behaviors chosen by particular men and women in particular circumstantial contexts.


"If you ask yourself, 'Should I do <em>x</em>?' what kinds of thinking do you think are involved in answering that kind of question?"


Okay, take an example Rand would focus on: the role of government in the economy. Is there a way for us to determine [philosophically, politically, ethically] what government should or should not do with respect to the economy?

I say no. There are only different [existential] opinions about it. Opinions that can never be reduced down to the optimal [most rational] assesssment of what is deemed ethical or unethical behavior on the part of government officials. Or on the part of citizens.

Now, these individual [subjective/intersubjective] points of view will flow from many sources---historical and cultural contexts, unique personal interactions, political economy, emotional and psychological predispositions, early childhood upbringing, books we read, people we meet, experiences we have. etc etc etc

But these points of view can be attached to dutiful behavior only if one incorporates God into the argument. Without God...an omniscient and omnipotent point of view...we fall back on the capacity [or lack thereof] to enforce the moral prescriptions and proscriptions of mere mortals.

And even if you are able to enforce your own that does not enable you to demonstrate [philosophically] they ought to be enforced. Only that they can be.


the nihilist

<strong>neither/nor wrote:</strong>
What does Kant's concept of radical evil have to do with actual human interactions deemed to be either good or evil? That's my point. I'm trying to situate philosophical assessments of human behavior such that they can be defended [or not] once the language is forced to come to terms with the actual consequences of particual behaviors chosen by particular men and women in particular circumstantial contexts.

... There are only different [existential] opinions about [what people should do]. Opinions that can never be reduced down to the optimal [most rational] assessment of what is deemed ethical or unethical behavior on the part of government officials. Or on the part of citizens.


If you're not addressing the theory of radical evil here, then I guess either you don't know what it is, or you might be better off starting your own thread about your existentialist (or whatever it is) account of ethics. The point of THIS thread is to point out that Ayn Rand, despite her avowed hatred of Kant, believed something about the nature of moral failure very similar to him, namely that particular transgressions don't occur on their own but must be derived from a general one involving a perversion of our attitude towards reason.

But these [individual/subjective] points of view can be attached to dutiful behavior only if one incorporates God into the argument. Without God...an omniscient and omnipotent point of view...we fall back on the capacity [or lack thereof] to enforce the moral prescriptions and proscriptions of mere mortals.

And even if you are able to enforce your own that does not enable you to demonstrate [philosophically] they ought to be enforced. Only that they can be.


I don't know what "can be attached to dutiful behavior" means. Do you mean that we have (A) a set of attitudes towards various actions as well as that (B) there is a set of real duties, but that (A) and (B) only overlap if (C) God exists? And where does this question of what ought to be enforced come in?

"The point of THIS thread is to point out that Ayn Rand, despite her avowed hatred of Kant, believed something about the nature of moral failure very similar to him, namely that particular transgressions don't occur on their own but must be derived from a general one involving a perversion of our attitude towards reason."

Yes, God is to Kant what Reason is to Rand: a metaphysical [transendental] font.

In other words, ultimately we must evaluate and judge human behavior based on an assessment of Right and Wrong that transcends the existential reality of ambiguity and uncertainty...of contingency, chance and change.

As soon as you bring Kant and Rand down to earth, they are lost without their Words. Without their assumptions about What Words Mean.

"I don't know what 'can be attached to dutiful behavior' means. Do you mean that we have (A) a set of attitudes towards various actions as well as that ( there is a set of real duties, but that (A) and ( only overlap if (C) God exists? And where does this question of what ought to be enforced come in?"

Well, let's bring this down to earth.

Kant and Rand both seem convinced we are "obligated" to comport ourselves in one way rather than another. It is our "duty" to behave morally rather than immorally. Why?

Obligation and duty are different from suggestions that rules of behavior are necessary in order to facilitate more rather than less functional social, political and economic relationships. Making that distinction is basically my aim here.

Behavioral rules are not the same as obligations---except in the broadest sense that human interaction inherently requires a set of rules to ward off chaos. Or to obviate the brute facticity embedded in a primitive survival of the fittest mentality.

If Kant and Rand were participating in this exchange I would draw them into a discussion of moral hazard as it relates to the real world. How far would their arguments go in circumstantial contexts that complex, convoluted and contradictory?

Perhaps someone here shares the philosophy of either Kant or Rand. Perhaps together we can choose a particular moral quandary and discuss these concepts more...existentially.

the nihilist

<strong>neither/nor wrote:</strong>
In other words, ultimately we must evaluate and judge human behavior based on an assessment of Right and Wrong that transcends the existential reality of ambiguity and uncertainty...of contingency, chance and change.

As soon as you bring Kant and Rand down to earth, they are lost without their Words. Without their assumptions about What Words Mean.


I won't speak for Rand here (I'll let "Objectivists" in her sense do that), but as for Kant, I really think you're being way too quick. The distance between the formulas of the categorical imperative and ordinary life seems vast, but there ARE discussions in Kant's ethics that involve exactly taking into account "ambiguity and uncertainty" and "contingency, chance and change."

Kant and Rand both seem convinced we are "obligated" to comport ourselves in one way rather than another. It is our "duty" to behave morally rather than immorally. Why?


Kant and Rand and any number of others (and they don't just SEEM convinced of this, they very explicitly ARE). As for it being our duty to behave morally, well, man, that's just a tautology. The word duty is normatively loaded with the same kind of meaning as morally is.

Obligation and duty are different from suggestions that rules of behavior are necessary in order to facilitate more rather than less functional social, political and economic relationships. Making that distinction is basically my aim here.

I won't disagree, and neither would Kant or Rand inasmuch as both these writers believed agents have obligations not only to each other but also to themselves.

If Kant and Rand were participating in this exchange I would draw them into a discussion of moral hazard as it relates to the real world. How far would their arguments go in circumstantial contexts that complex, convoluted and contradictory?

I don't know what you mean by "moral hazard," so despite my intensely Kantian views...

Perhaps someone here shares the philosophy of either Kant or Rand. Perhaps together we can choose a particular moral quandary and discuss these concepts more...existentially.

In another thread, I hope.

"The distance between the formulas of the categorical imperative and ordinary life seems vast, but there ARE discussions in Kant's ethics that involve exactly taking into account 'ambiguity and uncertainty' and 'contingency, chance and change.'"


Yes, you can take them into account, but once they are encompassed in an argument about a particular human behavior in a particular circumstantial context, the evaluation and judgement of that behavior becomes problematic. To speak of an obligation to behave in a particular way so as to reflect the duty-bound agenda of a deontological approach to human ethics becomes equally problematic. And this is so for all moral assessments---from behavior revolving around abortion to decisions made regarding the pursuit of "just war".



"As for it being our duty to behave morally, well, man, that's just a tautology."


Yes, but, again, only in the sense that social interaction perforce requires us to establish rules of behavior. Otherwise we are back in the jungle in a dog eat dog struggle for survival. But in acknowledging this it says nothing essential about the capacity of mere mortals to judge the rules from the perspective of God [transcendental, omniscient] or Reason [metaphysical, epistemological truths]. Such assessments are existential---grounded always in ever shifting and changing interpretations of what constitutes right and wrong, good and bad human behavior.

Out in the real world it is political and economic power that establishes the parameters of moral hazard, not the philosophies of Kant or Rand.

the nihilist

<strong>neither/nor wrote:</strong>
Yes, you can take them into account, but once they are encompassed in an argument about a particular human behavior in a particular circumstantial context, the evaluation and judgement of that behavior becomes problematic. To speak of an obligation to behave in a particular way so as to reflect the duty-bound agenda of a deontological approach to human ethics becomes equally problematic.

Problematic in what sense?



Yes, but, again, only in the sense that social interaction perforce requires us to establish rules of behavior.

I meant that concepts of duty are the same thing as concepts of morality, more or less. But then maybe we're not on the same page right now when it comes to the concept of morality.

But in acknowledging this it says nothing essential about the capacity of mere mortals to judge the rules from the perspective of God [transcendental, omniscient] or Reason [metaphysical, epistemological truths]. Such assessments are existential---grounded always in ever shifting and changing interpretations of what constitutes right and wrong, good and bad human behavior.

Out in the real world it is political and economic power that establishes the parameters of moral hazard, not the philosophies of Kant or Rand.

Maybe, but I don't know what moral hazard is. And talking about what the nature of our ability to judge rules is, isn't to explicitly talk about whether particular wrongdoing must derive from general wrongdoing, which is the theory of radical evil.