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Written by <a href='/index.php?option=com_community&view=profile&userid=68&Itemid=121'>danieleaton</a>
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Wednesday, 19 March 2008 02:34 |
 Book: Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics, Oxford University Press, 2007, 269pp.,
Daniel Jacobson: "Berys Gaut's new book offers an extended argument for moralism about art: roughly, the thesis that the intrinsic moral flaws of an artwork count as aesthetic flaws, and its moral merits as aesthetic merits. The recent debate over moralism in the philosophy of art has generated some unfortunate terminological and taxonomic confusion. Gaut navigates this morass deftly, homing in on what is at issue between moralism and its two competitors: autonomism and an anti-theoretical view sometimes misleadingly termed immoralism. Autonomism holds that the moral qualities and defects of artworks are never aesthetically relevant. The anti-theoretical view holds that although the moral qualities of art are sometimes aesthetically relevant (contra autonomism), its morally dubious features can be among its aesthetic merits and its morally salutary features among its aesthetic flaws (contra moralism)." more
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