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Written by <a href='/community/profile/64-causation/'>causation</a>
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Wednesday, 15 June 2005 02:29 |
Book: Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Oxford University Press, 2004, 248pp
Juan Comesaña (for NDPR): "What is Pyrrhonian skepticism? This question is at least in the background of many of the papers in this collection, and it is by no means clear that all the authors agree about its answer. But we can start by saying that the implied contrast is with cartesian (or Academic) skepticism. Cartesian skeptics think that we do not know most of the propositions that we ordinarily take ourselves to know -- and, thus, cartesian skeptics think that we should suspend judgment about those propositions. Pyrrhonian skeptics, on the other hand, go one step beyond cartesian skeptics (or, depending on your perspective, stop one step short), and think that we should suspend judgment also with respect to epistemic claims -- with respect to whether we do or do not know what we ordinarily take ourselves to know. Thus, in one sense Pyrrhonian skepticism is more radical than cartesian skepticism (it entails that we should suspend judgment with respect to more claims), and in another it is more moderate (it does not entail that we do not know what we ordinarily take ourselves to know)." more
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