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Written by <a href='/community/profile/68-danieleaton/'>danieleaton</a>
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Sunday, 12 November 2006 04:27 |
Alfred R. Mele, Free Will and Luck, Oxford University Press, 2006, 223pp.,
Saul Smilansky (for NDPR): Mele "does not think that libertarians have made significant progress in quieting the luck-related worries. And he is not one of those bite-the-bullet compatibilists, who do not care about ultimate luck. Hence, he should be much more concerned about hard determinism (or some similar pessimistic incompatibilism). In other words, the temperament of Mele's work, here as previously, is open, but optimistic: compatibilism is probably successful, and so is libertarianism; since either is sufficient, all is well. But I doubt whether all this optimism is justified by Mele's own arguments. Even if we have a measure of free will and moral responsibility, all is not well, if we care about luck, due to the limits it imposes upon control, and the ensuing moral arbitrariness. " more
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