CFP: The Monist: Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness |
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Written by <a href='/community/profile/5028-didymus/'>Didymus</a>
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Saturday, 10 March 2007 02:44 |
Deadline for Submissions: April 30, 2007
Advisory Editors: Terence Horgan and Uriah Kriegel (University of Arizona) <
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While intentionality and phenomenal consciousness were traditionally conceived as the two most central dimensions of the mind, they were almost always treated independently. Over the past two decades, however, several philosophers have attempted to account for consciousness in terms of intentionality. More recently, a view has developed according to which intentionality is itself somehow dependent upon consciousness. On this view, the intentionality of unconscious intentional states is merely derivative of, or otherwise dependent upon, the intentionality of phenomenally conscious states.
This issue of The Monist will explore the question of the relationship between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. In particular, we are interested in (i) whether phenomenally conscious states have a form of intentionality or of intentional content that is distinctive or sui generis, and (ii) whether the intentionality of conscious states enjoys some kind of primacy over other forms of intentionality. Other questions to be addressed include: Are phenomenally conscious states inherently intentional? Is the intentionality of phenomenally conscious states - or ‘phenomenal intentionality’ - different from the intentionality of other mental and non-mental representations? If so, what are its distinctive characteristics?
Uriah Kriegel
Department of Philosophy
University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia
http://uriahkriegel.com
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