Corey Brettschneider is Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Brown University, where he teaches courses in political theory and public law. He received a PhD in Politics from Princeton University and a JD from Stanford University. His recent articles include "Balancing Procedures and Outcomes Within Democratic Theory: Core Values and Judicial Review," in Political Studies (2005) and "The Value Theory of Democracy," in Politics, Philosophy and Economics (2006). In this interview with Paul Neufeld he discusses his recent book: Democratic Rights: The Substance of Self-Government.

Ephilosopher: A striking feature of this book, evident from the table of contents onward, is both its depth and breadth. The later chapters discuss an array of topics: the right to privacy, the rights of the punished, private property, welfare, and judicial review. Yet these are not discussed piecemeal, but in the context of earlier chapters, which develop no less than a theory democracy. This is an ambitious project. What motivated this book and what are its origins?

Brettschneider : I started writing the book about five years ago. Although it was a new project, I drew from themes I wrestled with in my dissertation. There I was concerned to develop an account of rights within the social contract tradition, in particular one grounded heavily in Rousseau. The book in many ways still reflects that influence. I propose to develop an account of rights, not as a constraint on democracy but as based in a certain ideal of a democratic people. Rousseau too sought to develop a similar account grounded in the general will. Unlike him, however, and unlike most contemporary theories of democracy—from Habermas to John Hart Ely—I reject the idea that we should think of ideal democracy exclusively in terms of a set of procedures for self government. In short, the ambition is similar to that of these other democratic thinkers, but my aim is to provide an alternative to their procedural approach.

Ephilosopher: Let’s talk about that alternative. The centerpiece of the book is what you call the “value theory of democracy,” which defends a set of “core” democratic values as necessary to an ideal democracy. This theory is engaged, almost immediately in chapter one, with the familiar “problem of constraint,” i.e., how we can reconcile the external constraints placed on democratic procedures and their outcomes, with the idea that democratic procedures are the basis for legitimizing politics. Judicial review is one example of such a constraint. I take it you think the “problem of constraint” cannot be resolved by understanding democracy purely as a set of procedures, e.g., voting. Rather, there are some inherently democratic values, the core values—which you label “political autonomy,” “equality of interests,” and “reciprocity”—which are part of the very notion of democracy. It is these values which legitimate imposing constraints. That is, if so called democratic procedures threaten to undermine core democratic values, these procedures ought to be constrained, not as an extra-democratic consideration (e.g., suspending democratic institutions in a state of emergency), but in defense of the substance of democracy itself. The problem of constraint is familiar. But your solution based on a set of “core” values is new. Are these values closest to something like (as you note) Rawls’ “overlapping consensus,” i.e., an appeal what most people in contemporary western democracies already accept? Or how are they are best characterized?

Brettschneider : The idea of the core values shares much with Rawls idea of the overlapping consensus. It draws, however, for a particular understanding of those values as respecting the shared status of citizens as rulers. In thinking of them this way I am particularly concerned to elaborate the core values as a normative standard tied to a certain ideal of democracy, not to rest them on any account of values present or latent in actual democracies or for that matter western democracy. The latter kind of standard seems to me to be too contingent on empirical matters and to suffer the same flaws as procedural theories. Namely there is nothing to prevent a society from culturally moving in a direction that rejects democracy or from values switching in that direction. In contrast I want to set up the core values as both a procedure independent and culture independent standard that can then be used to judge actual democracies. This leads me the possibility of claiming that a particular culture or polity has widely rejected the very idea of democracy. So, to the extent that Rawls is sometimes read to merely be endorsing “existing” values rather than ideal ones then our accounts differ. I happen to think that is not the best overall understanding of the overlapping consensus and have argued this in a separate article but it certainly is widely thought of that way. To be continued . . .

1st Global Conference Forgiveness: Probing the Boundaries Friday 14th March - Sunday 16th March 2008 Salzburg, Austria This inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary conference project seeks to investigate and explore the nature, significance, and practices of forgiveness. Asking for or granting forgiveness can often be a routine part of everyday life, but the nature of forgiveness as a personal, social and even international practice can be quite complex. It raises a wide variety of questions that touch on a vast array of academic disciplines. In cases of significant transgressions, social tensions, and even international conflicts the questions of what counts as forgiveness and how granting or withholding it can fundamentally change individual or international relationships becomes both more difficult and important to assess. This conference will look at the full range of this complexity. To encourage innovative trans-disciplinary dialogues, we warmly welcome papers from all disciplines, professions and vocations. Papers, presentations, reports and workshops are invited on issues on or broadly related to any of the following themes: 1. Questions of Definition ~ What is forgiveness? ~ What sorts of behaviour require people to seek forgiveness? ~ Who can grant forgiveness? Can there be meaningful third party forgiveness? ~ Who benefits from forgiveness and how? ~ Can forgiveness be required of someone? Can it ever be wrong to offer forgiveness? 2. Psychological Perspectives ~ The emotional effect of victimization and the role forgiveness can play in either exacerbating or mitigating such feelings ~ The nature of self-forgiveness ~ Barriers to people's ability to forgive transgressors ~ How a willingness (or unwillingness) to forgive can be a measure of self-worth or self-respect ~ Issues related to the psychological burden of not forgiving